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Abstract
Research in social psychology points to a discontinuity between the individual self and the
collective self such that operating at the collective level of identity leads one to be more biased,
defensive, and hostile than when operating at the individual level of identity. One area of
research where this distinction is particularly apparent is that of identity threat and affirmation
theory. Although affirming the self has been shown to reduce individual-level biases in the face
of threat, affirming the group in response to a collective-level threat has been shown to
accentuate biased tendencies. This may be a result of the inherent inflexibility of the collective
self. Unlike self-affirmation, group-affirmation may induce a focus on a specific social identity
and activate the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, and norms) pertinent to that
identity which then guide subsequent thoughts, judgments, motivations, and behaviors. This
raises the question, if the collective self is construed in this manner, are there certain contexts in
which affirming the group can in fact lead to a reduction in bias and defensiveness in the face of
threat? Two potential contexts are addressed in this research: (a) if the threat is to one’s
individual-level identity (Study 1) and (b) if having unbiased attitudes are a component of the
affirmed group’s psychological identity (Study 2). Affirming the group did not affect
participants’ attributional tendencies following a self-threatening task performance. Groupaffirmation did, however, increase positive attitudes towards certain out-groups for lowidentifying group members. Also, unlike affirming the self, affirming the group did not protect
participants’ self-esteem from either an individual-level threat or a collective-level threat,
providing further support for the notion that self- and group-affirmation are distinct processes.
The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.
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1
Using Affirmation Theory to Further Understand the Distinction between the Individual Self and
the Collective Self
The relationship between the individual self and the collective self is a topic that has
guided research in the field of social psychology for decades. In fact, Floyd Allport (1962)
classifies the question of how best to conceptualize the nature of the individual and the group as
the “master problem of social psychology” (p. 7). Although his analysis primarily refers to
performance differences in individual and group settings (i.e., social facilitation effects), other
researchers have reformulated this “problem” as the study of how the self is fundamentally
defined at the individual and collective levels and the effects that these levels of representation
have on interindividual and intergroup psychological processes and behavior (Brewer &
Gardner, 1996). Many lines of research, for instance, seem to demonstrate that there is a
fundamental distinction between individual-level processes and collective-level processes such
that, when operating at the collective level of identity, one becomes more biased, hostile, and
beholden to group-based norms and stereotypes than when operating at the individual level of
identity (see Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Yzerbyt and Demoulin, 2010)
One area of research in which this distinction has become particularly manifest is identity
threat and affirmation theory. Although it has been demonstrated that affirming one’s individuallevel identity can be an effective strategy for reducing defensiveness and hostility in the face of
self-threats (Sherman & Cohen, 2002), affirming a collective-level identity tends to be
ineffective at countering group-level threats, sometimes even accentuating intergroup biases and
hostility (Cehajic-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Ehrlich & Gramzow,
2015). I posit that this distinction occurs because the collective self is inherently less flexible
than the individual self, thus constraining one’s response to threat at that level of identity. Rather
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than buffering against the threat, group-affirmation activates the attitudes and biases associated
with the affirmed group’s identity, often leading to even more defensiveness. One question that
arises from this perspective is whether there are any instances in which operating at the
collective level of identity can actually reduce biased tendencies. For instance, under what
circumstances might the group-level mind-set inspired by group-affirmation lead one to become
less defensive, biased, and hostile in the face of threatening information? This question is
explored in two studies. First, the effect of group-affirmation on the tendency to engage in
individual-level biases in response to a self-threat is tested. Then, the question of whether
affirming a group membership can lead to a reduction in bias at the collective level of identity is
assessed in a specific context: namely, when being unbiased (e.g., having favorable attitudes
towards certain out-groups) is a part of the affirmed group’s psychological identity.
The Individual Self and the Collective Self
When people engage with their social world, they act not just as individuals, but also as
members of collectives with shared identities, goals, and perceptions (Abrams & Hogg, 2004).
Social identity theorists (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1984) define the collective self (social identity) as
the aspects of a person’s self-concept that are derived from his/her membership in various
groups. In contrast, one’s individual self (personal identity) is composed of the idiosyncratic
components of the self that differentiate oneself from other specific individuals (Brewer, 1991).
SIT was formulated to explain the processes underlying intergroup behavior and is based on the
notion that people continually strive to enhance or maintain positive self-images and, further,
that group memberships are often central and important components of the self-concept (Tropp
& Wright, 2001). Group members receive both material and psychological support from the in-
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group (e.g., a sense of security and belonging), and these resources contribute to an individual’s
overall sense of self-worth (Correll & Park, 2005).
The theoretical relationship between one’s personal and social identities was elaborated
on by Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) in their development of selfcategorization theory (SCT). SCT posits that the self can be categorized at different levels of
abstraction, and that it is the social context that determines the level that is most salient at any
given time. These levels range from the self as a unique individual to the self as the embodiment
of an important in-group. When one’s individual identity is salient, personal needs, motives, and
beliefs drive behavior. When a social identity is salient, a process of depersonalization occurs in
which people begin to see themselves as “interchangeable exemplars” of their social category,
and collective needs, motives, and beliefs become primary. It is at this social level of identity
that group processes emerge (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Brewer and Gardner
(1996) further explore the nature of these levels of identity or “self-representations,” and argue
that, when operating at the individual level, people tend to define themselves in terms of unique
personal traits and use other in-group members as the basis for social comparison processes.
When operating at the collective level, on the other hand, people define themselves in
accordance with group prototypes and use intergroup differences as the basis for social
comparison. Furthermore, shifting between levels of self-representation is a fluid and dynamic
process, and people can readily alternate between operating as an individual and operating as a
group member depending on the current social context.
Although the study of the collective self and intergroup processes requires a different
level of explanation than the study of the personal self and interindividual processes (Hogg,
2003), it is often implied in the reasoning of social identity theorists that the psychological
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processes taking place at these two levels of identity should be similar and operate in a parallel
fashion. In fact, Turner et al. (1994) state that the personal self and the collective self “arise from
the same general processes, and both are aspects of the normal variation of the self, a variation
built into its function (p. 460). For these researchers, the personal self and the collective self
represent the opposing ends of a “functionally antagonistic” continuum. In other words, as one’s
identification with a group becomes more and more salient, a corresponding functional decrease
in the salience of one’s personal self and its associated attributes takes place (and vice-versa).
The essential differences, then, between these two ends of the continuum are (a) what constitutes
“the self” (the individual versus a group prototype), (b) one’s frame of reference (interpersonal
versus intergroup comparisons), and (c) one’s basic social motivation (self-interest versus
collective interest) (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Thus, according to this theoretical perspective, the
psychological processes themselves that occur at the individual level and collective level should
be similar.
This mind-set is echoed by researchers who have taken certain psychological constructs
traditionally studied at the individual level of identity and applied them to the collective level.
Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), for instance, developed a measure of collective self-esteem in an
effort to extend this individual-based personality variable to the collective level of identity. They
argue that, just as personal self-esteem is enhanced by making positive interpersonal
comparisons and engaging in positive biases that favor the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988),
collective self-esteem can be enhanced through positive intergroup comparisons (Crocker, Blain,
& Luhtanen, 1993). A similar extension has recently been put forth for the construct of
narcissism. Collective narcissism refers to an “emotional investment in an unrealistic belief
about the unparalleled greatness of an in-group” (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, and
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Jayawickreme (2009) p. 1074). Thus, collective narcissism is essentially an extension of the
narcissistic trait to the collective level of identity in that it involves idealizing an in-group rather
than the individual self. Additionally, similar relationships between narcissism and other
personality traits, such as aggressiveness, have been shown to emerge at the individual and
collective levels of identity. For example, as is the case with narcissism and individual-level
threats, collective narcissism coupled with a threat to the in-group has been shown to produce
aggressive, hostile, and derogatory reactions directed towards the group responsible for the threat
(Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013).
In addition to trait-level variables, researchers have begun to explore the applicability of
various emotional processes typically analyzed at the individual and interpersonal level to that of
the collective. For example, there is growing evidence that people can experience self-conscious
emotions such as guilt and shame when operating as a group member (as opposed to as an
individual). In other words, they report experiencing these emotions in response to acts
committed (either in the past or present) by members of groups to which they belong even if they
personally did not participate in such behavior (Tangney & Tracy, 2012). Furthermore, the
factors that affect the experiencing of these collective emotions seem to parallel those that affect
the experiencing of those emotions at the individual level (Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla,
Deonna, and Teroni, 2014). As is the case with interpersonal guilt, for instance, feelings of
collective guilt stem from the committing of harmful acts perceived to be unjustified or
illegitimate (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002).
A Discontinuity between the Individual Self and Collective Self
Despite the growing trend in the literature to take individual-level psychological
constructs and apply them in a parallel fashion to the collective level of identity, I argue that this
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transfer of process is not as clear-cut as some have posited (see Turner et al., 1994). Indeed,
many lines of research in social psychology point to a fundamental distinction in how people
think, feel, and behave when operating at the collective as opposed to the individual level of
identity. In general, these lines of research indicate that a group-level mind-set seems to result in
more aggressive and defensive responding and greater adherence to group-based norms and
biases than an individual-level mind-set. Research on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity
effect, for instance, reveals that there is a tendency for people to behave in a more competitive
(and less cooperative) fashion when in intergroup situations than when in interpersonal situations
(Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). Using laboratory-based mixed-motive games
such as the prisoner’s dilemma, researchers have discovered a distinct pattern such that
participants tend to adopt more cooperative strategies and use more cooperative language when
involved in one-on-one interactions than when the interactions involve groups of two or more
(Insko et al., 1994). In fact, the number of people in each group has not been found to be a
powerful determinant in the competitiveness of the behavior. The primary distinction comes
when an interaction between individuals is compared to an interaction between groups, no matter
the size (Schopler & Insko, 1992). The explanation for this effect which seems to have gained
the most traction states that people are more prone to feelings of fear and greed when operating
as a group member than when operating as an individual (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). This is
attributed to the inherent sense of distrust that people tend to experience in intergroup situations,
as well as to the influence of such depersonalizing factors as individual anonymity and adherence
to in-group norms which foster antisocial tendencies.
Research from the perspective of appraisal theory and intergroup emotions (Smith, 1993)
also emphasizes a discontinuity in terms of how people process their social environments at the
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individual and collective levels of identity. Essentially, when operating as an individual,
situations are appraised in terms of their relevance to one’s personal interests, whereas when
operating as a group member, situations are appraised in terms of their relevance to the in-group
as a whole. Thus, when a group identity is salient, people use it as a filter through which they
assess the situation, react emotionally to it, and decide on a course of action. In their analysis,
Yzerbyt and Demoulin (2010) argue that there is often a contrast in how these emotional
appraisals affect one’s behavior. When operating at the personal level, they argue, individual
emotional reactions to an event or situation shape behavior and attitudes. In contrast, when
operating at the collective level, “people’s beliefs and actions are aligned with their
understanding of those features that define their group as opposed to a salient outgroup” (p.
1048). Thus, the inherent comparative nature of the collective level of analysis has an indelible
influence on how one interprets information and experiences a situation. For example, when
asked to indicate their emotional reactions to out-group members as individuals, people’s ratings
tend to be quite varied (containing both positive and negative elements) and based on their
individual experiences and encounters with members of those groups (Dijker, Koomen, van den
Heuvel, & Frijda, 1996). Conversely, when a specific social identity is made salient, people tend
to appraise out-group members in terms of the content and characteristics associated with that
particular intergroup relationship (e.g., differences in core values and perceived power dynamics)
which often translate to negative attitudes and anti-social behavioral intentions towards outgroups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008).
The distinction between individual and group-level processes is also emphasized by
Brewer (1998) in her model of social categorization and person perception. She argues that,
although social categorization, in general, is a process of partitioning “the multidimensional
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variability among human begins into discrete subsets, accompanied by accentuation of perceived
intracategory similarities and intercategory differences” (p. 695), distinct factors come into play
when that categorization process involves social identities to which one belongs. She thus
differentiates between “hot cognition” and “cold cognition” based on whether the in-group, and
all its associated emotional significance, is involved in the person perception process. In cases of
cold cognition, social categorization and differentiation occur when category prototypes,
perceived trait distributions, and notions of the social meaning of categories are assigned based
on experience and social learning, devoid of reference to the self-concept or any in-group.
However, when the elements of self-referencing and social comparison become involved, and ingroup-out-group differentiation occurs alongside categorization, cognition becomes “hot” and
biased into “us-not us” terms based on the stereotypes and biases associated with one’s salient
social identity. Thus, categorizing at the level of the collective tends to result in more bias and
hostility than categorizing at the level of the individual.
Self-Affirmation and Group-Affirmation
One area of research in which the distinction between the individual and collective selves
has received more recent attention is that of identity threat and affirmation. According to selfaffirmation theory, people can counter threats to the individual-level self-concept and maintain a
sense of integrity by affirming a valued domain of the self that is unrelated to the threat (Spencer,
Fein, & Lomore, 2001; Steele, 1988). This can be accomplished, for example, by reflecting on a
positive aspect of one’s self-concept or engaging in an activity that makes such an aspect salient,
such as writing about an important self-relevant value (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski 2008).
While doing this, individuals experience a boost to their self-worth and become more confident
and secure, enabling them to evaluate potentially self-threatening information in a less defensive
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and biased manner. For example, people tend to interpret ambiguous self-relevant information in
a manner that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs and desires (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).
After affirming the self, however, people are more likely to consider evidence that contradicts
their own beliefs or view an issue from perspectives other than their own (Sherman & Cohen,
2002). This self-affirmation effect extends to group-based threats and biases. If the motivation to
protect the self is satisfied through self-affirmation, one can respond to information and threats
relevant to one’s group memberships (other domains of the self) in a more objective way, thus
making the group-serving biases normally exhibited following a threat less necessary. This biasreducing pattern has been found in several group-based contexts, including group-serving
attributions made by intramural sports teams (Sherman & Kim, 2005), perceptions of racism
exhibited by in-group members (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006), and self-reported ethnic
prejudice (Zarate & Garza, 2002).
Because a plethora of studies have shown that affirming the self at the individual level
can bolster the self-concept, reduce defensiveness, and mitigate self-serving biases (see
McQueen & Klein, 2006), it has been posited that one should similarly be able to counter threats
to one’s social identity and mitigate collective-level biases by affirming that group identity (such
as reflecting on a value important to that group; Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost,
2007). Additionally, Derks, van Laar, and Ellemers (2009) argue that, to the extent that one’s
personal identity and social identity overlap and are highly connected, it could be reasoned that
group-affirmation should be just as effective at countering group-related threats as is selfaffirmation. Thus, it might be expected that affirming a group identity will bolster one’s sense of
self-integrity, making one more open to possible group-threatening information and mitigating
the need to make group-serving judgments. Such an effect has not been produced consistently,
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however. Although Gunn and Wilson (2011) did find that men (Experiment 1) and Canadians
(Experiment 2) who performed a group-affirmation task were more willing to express feelings of
collective guilt and shame after reading about historical in-group transgressions against women
and Canadian Aboriginals, respectively, the bias-reducing effect of group-affirmation has not
been reproduced in different contexts. Cehajic-Clancy et al. (2011), for instance, found that
Israeli students who performed a self-affirmation task were more willing to express group-based
guilt, acknowledge responsibility for wrongdoing, and support reparative measures with respect
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Students who performed a group-affirmation task, however,
did not show this reparatory shift and continued to demonstrate a significant bias favoring the ingroup.
In fact, some empirical findings seem to indicate that affirming a social identity can even
exacerbate the tendency to exhibit group-level biases. Glasford, Dovidio, and Pratto (2009)
found that students who were given the opportunity to affirm their American identities showed
no increase in collective guilt after reading a report describing a bombing run made by American
soldiers in which many foreign civilians were killed. Additionally, participants who affirmed
their nationality exhibited less psychological discomfort after reading the report than did those
who did not group-affirm, and this pattern was especially strong for those highly identified with
their nationality. The authors explain this decrease in psychological discomfort following groupaffirmation as a reduction in “intragroup dissonance.” This finding also suggests an increased
willingness to tolerate in-group transgressions (and thus a greater tendency to exhibit biases
favoring the in-group) among the group-affirmed. Additionally, I have found in my own research
that affirming one’s political identity not only fails to reduce group-level political biases, but
even intensifies them (thus having the opposite effect of self-affirmation; Ehrlich & Gramzow,
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2015). Specifically, I found that participants tended to evaluate members of the opposing
political party more negatively than they evaluated members of their own party. This groupserving evaluative bias was magnified when participants first affirmed a value endorsed by the
group (i.e., group-affirmation) compared to when they endorsed a personally held value (i.e.,
self-affirmation). Thus, rather than behaving in a concurrent fashion, self- and group-affirmation
seem to have distinct effects on how one responds to identity threats such that affirming the
collective self can lead to greater defensiveness and the strengthening of in-group biases.
Affirmation Processes and the Nature of the Individual and Collective Selves
Along with research on the discontinuity effect, intergroup appraisals and social
categorization, I posit that the distinction between self- and group-affirmation effects reflect a
fundamental difference between the nature of the individual and collective selves. Structurally,
the individual self-concept is generally presented as being composed of a set of basic-level “selfaspects” encompassing various attributes, emotional states, roles, activities, and relationships
(Markus & Wurf, 1987; Oyserman, Elmore, & Smith, 2012). The individual self is thus
“inherently flexible in content and organization” (DeSteno and Salovey, 1997, p. 396) with the
activation of one’s various attributes and roles being dependent upon one’s social context.
Markus and Wurf use the example of having multiple tennis-related selves. Some situations,
such as playing tennis against a friend, may activate one’s “good sport self,” whereas other
contexts, such as playing in a competitive tournament, may activate one’s “win at all costs self.”
Thus, the structure of the individual self lends itself to flexibility and malleability in terms of
content and process.
The structure of the collective self, on the other hand, is more ambiguous. Brewer (1991),
for instance, refers to the collective self and social identity as simply an “extension of the self
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beyond the level of the individual” (p. 476). Other researchers seem to fold specific group
memberships into the same category as social roles and thus present social identities as relational
aspects of the individual self-concept (e.g., McConnell, 2011). I suggest that the collective self
can be construed as more or less a combination of those two ideas. Rather than as role-based
components of one’s individual-level self, one’s multiple social identities can be conceived of as
independent (although sometimes overlapping) branches extending out from one’s overall selfconcept. When one group membership, or “branch,” becomes salient, one is more likely to think
and behave in line with the attributes and guiding norms of that group (and intergroup situations
in general). This notion fits in with the logic of Simon (1997) who posits that the individual self
and the collective self differ in terms of the number of self-aspects that compose each of those
selves. Whereas the collective self consists of one single, dominant self-aspect, the individual
self is based on a comprehensive, non-redundant set of one’s total self-aspects. Additionally,
research by Lowell Gaertner and colleagues (Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002;
Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O’Mara, & Gebauer, 2013) has shown that the individual self can be
characterized as being “primary” as compared to the collective self (such that people tend to
think more deeply about the individual self and defend and enhance it to a greater degree than
the collective self). If the individual self is indeed one’s “psychological home base,” then it
makes sense that it would be more complex and flexible than the individual branches
representing various collective identities.
Conceptualizing the collective self in this manner implies that, when operating as a group
member, one can become constrained by the norms and biases associated with that particular
social identity, thus limiting one’s cognitive, affective, and behavioral flexibility. When
operating as an individual, on the other hand, the self-concept is more malleable as one can
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experience and respond to his/her social environment independent of any group-based frame.
The rigidity which characterizes psychological processing at the collective level of identity is
manifested in the findings discussed earlier with respect to self- and group-affirmation. A selfaffirmation manipulation may provide a boost to the self by inducing a focus on positive aspects
of one’s global (individual-level) sense of self, or “overall self-concept of worth” (Steele, 1988,
p. 266), thus making aspects of the self that are related to certain group memberships less salient
and mitigating the need to defend those identities. In fact, Critcher and Dunning (2015)
demonstrate that affirming the self reduces defensiveness in the face of threat precisely because
it expands the working self-concept, takes advantage of the flexible nature of the individual self,
and directs attention away from the threatened domain.
On the other hand, it is possible that affirming the group does not produce the consistent,
bias-reducing effect that affirming the self does because group-affirmation induces a focus on a
specific social identity and activates the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes,
norms, behavioral tendencies, intergroup comparisons) pertinent to that identity. Once activated,
this group-specific mindset guides subsequent thoughts, judgments, motivations, and behaviors.
A by-product of this mindset would be an increase in biases that serve to establish, protect, and
enhance the worth and integrity of the in-group. Thus, when the individual self is threatened in a
specific domain, one can address that threat directly (such as by psychologically devaluing the
importance of that domain) or indirectly by focusing on positive aspects of the self in other
domains. At the collective level, however, this malleability may not be possible, resulting in
greater defensiveness, competitiveness and adherence to group norms.
Furthermore, the distinct processes underlying self- and group-affirmation point to a
larger psychological domain in which the enhanced flexibility of the individual self in
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comparison to the collective self is especially evident: self-protection strategies and threat
response. When one’s self-concept is threatened or devalued at either the individual level or the
collective level, one becomes motivated to protect the self and engage in “affective, cognitive,
and behavioral strivings that counteract threat, aiming to reestablish equanimity” (Sedikides,
2012, p. 328). At the individual level of identity, self-protection can take a multitude of forms.
For instance, one can address the threat directly by altering how the threat (or the presumed
implications of the threat) is construed (Campbell, Sedikides, Reeder, & Elliot, 2000), derogating
or rejecting the source of the threat (Bourgeois & Leary, 2001), or shifting social comparison
strategies to make oneself appear more favorable (Jordan & Monin, 2008). One can also protect
the self through more indirect methods. These may include affirming the self-concept in a
domain unrelated to the threat (as previously discussed), disengaging from a particularly
threatening context (Leitner, Hehman, Deegan, & Jones, 2014), or strategically forgetting
potentially self-threatening information (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). Thus, people can be
quite flexible in terms of how they react to individual-level threats to their self-concepts and selfaffirmation is one manifestation of that flexibility.
Although self-protection is a malleable process when operating at the individual level of
identity, potential responses to group-level threats tend to be constrained by the group-based
norms and intergroup comparisons relevant to the threatened social identity. Hogg (2003) argues
that social identities acquire meaning because in-groups are different from, and compared
against, out-groups (although see Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Orina, 2006). Because of this, any
sort of threat response or group-enhancing strategy (such as group-affirmation) is inherently
based on this intergroup comparison process. Additionally, when identifying as a group member,
“a person is influenced by group norms, behaves in line with those norms, and shares the
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concerns and interests of the group” (Abrams & Hogg, 2004). Thus, one’s response to grouplevel threats will be constrained by the norms associated with that group. This limits the number
of strategies one can use when countering threats at the intergroup level. For example, Ellemers
and van Rijswijk (1997) posit that one can use either an “individual-level” or a “group-level”
identity management strategy when confronted with a threat to one’s social identity. Essentially,
they argue that one can either leave the threatened group (physically or psychologically) or
engage in cognitive and behavioral processes “aimed at challenging the source of the threat and
changing the present status configuration insofar as it is unfavorable to the in-group” (Ellemers,
Spears, and Doosje, 2002, p. 176). Thus, when one affirms a collective identity in response to
group-level threat, he/she is simply reinforcing the norms and intergroup comparisons associated
with that group, making it even more likely he/she will challenge the threat by becoming more
defensive and biased.
The Current Research
Research on the distinction between the individual and collective selves, particularly
within the context of affirmation theory, suggests that, because of its inherent inflexibility,
operating at the collective level of identity generally leads to the expression of thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors that are defensive, biased, and even hostile in nature. Indeed, there is a substantial
dearth of research touting the positive effects a group-level mind-set can have on one’s attitudes
and behaviors. This raises the question of whether there are certain situations in which operating
at the collective level of identity can, in fact, reduce, rather than exacerbate, biased tendencies.
With respect to affirmation theory, are there contexts in which affirming the group can “work”
such that it leads to a reduction in defensiveness and bias as does self-affirmation?
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The current research explores two scenarios in which affirming one’s collective identity
may buffer against threat and reduce defensiveness. The first is if the threat occurs at the
individual level of identity. Just as affirming an aspect of the individual self can decrease bias
following a threat to one’s collective identity (Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015; Sherman & Kim,
2005), perhaps affirming an aspect of the collective self can reduce bias following a threat to
one’s personal identity. In this context, the sense of belonging and other social resources (Correll
& Park, 2005) one receives from his/her group membership can be used to bolster one’s feelings
of self-worth in the face of the individual-level threat (Shnabel, Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, Garcia,
& Cohen, 2013). Additionally, because there is no intergroup comparison process taking place at
the individual level of identity, any attitudes and biases that affirming the group might activate
are not likely to be relevant at that level. However, there is also research which suggests that
affirming the group may not be an effective way to reduce individual-level biases. Work on the
motivational primacy of the individual self (Gaertner et al., 2002; Sedikides et al., 2013), for
instance, suggests that people are more reactive to threats and enhancements of the individual
self than the collective self. Thus, a group-affirmation may not be potent enough to bolster the
self in response to an individual-level threat. This question is explored in Study 1, which tests if
affirming one’s collective identity (in comparison to one’s personal identity) provides a boost to
the self-concept and reduces the tendency to make self-serving attributional biases following a
poor performance on an intelligence task.
A second scenario in which affirming the group may have a bias-reducing effect is if
being unbiased is a part of the affirmed group’s psychological identity. For instance, one may be
a part of a group in which it is the norm to have favorable, unbiased attitudes towards certain
out-groups. Thus, affirming that collective identity following a threat may activate those
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favorable attitudes and reduce bias towards members of those groups. Some tangential evidence
for this argument can be found in previous research. For example, the Israeli students in CehajicClancy et al. (2011)’s study who affirmed their nationality may have shown no increase in
collective guilt or responsibility because the biases and motives associated with their collective
identities as “Israelis” had become more salient (presuming that, given the historical and ongoing
intergroup tension, Israelis and Palestinians are not “supposed” to feel guilty or responsible for
the suffering of the other group). On the other hand, Gunn and Wilson (2011) may have found an
increase in feelings of collective guilt and shame for an in-group’s historical mistreatment of an
out-group (men’s mistreatment of women and Canadians’ mistreatment of aboriginal tribes) after
group-affirmation because that type of behavior is no longer considered socially acceptable.
Thus, one’s “male” and “Canadian” identities may contain the sentiment that mistreatment of
women and aboriginals, respectively, is wrong and that guilt and shame are the proper emotions
to exhibit towards such transgressions. Study 2 tests this hypothesis directly and assesses
whether affirming one’s political identity can simultaneously decrease biased attitudes towards
those out-groups one’s political party considers favorable and increase biased attitudes towards
groups considered unfavorable.
In addition to being the first known studies to directly test the effects of groupaffirmation on defensiveness and bias in these two scenarios, this research also seeks to address
two other theoretical issues relevant to the affirmation process. The first issue is the relationship
between identity affirmation and self-esteem. Self-esteem is rarely mentioned directly in research
on affirmation theory. Rather, self-affirmation is characterized as boosting one’s “sense of selfintegrity” (Steele, 1988) or “general feelings of worth” (Sherman et al., 2007). It is unclear
whether these descriptions refer to self-esteem or to a more abstract self-evaluative construct.
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Generally, when self-esteem is included in a study on affirmation theory, it is conceptualized as a
categorical moderator of affirmation effects (see McQueen and Klein, 2006). Very little work
has tested whether affirming the self (or affirming the group) can protect one’s self-esteem in the
face of identity threats. Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, and Dijksterhuis (1999) did find that
affirming the self reduced ruminative tendencies and led to more positive name-letter evaluations
(a general measure of self-worth) following a self-threat. More recently, Spencer-Rogers, Major,
Forster, and Peng (2016) found that identity affirmation bolstered self-esteem following a threat
to participants’ gender identities. The current studies test whether affirming the self and
affirming the group can boost self-esteem following both an individual-level threat (Study 1) and
a collective-level threat (Study 2).
The second issue relates to the timing of the affirmation manipulation. There is some
ambiguity in the literature regarding whether people should be affirmed before or after a threat in
order to effectively bolster the self-concept and reduce defensiveness. Because positive
affirmation results have been reported in both scenarios, McQueen and Klein (2006) conclude
that the timing of the affirmation is not a pertinent factor when it comes to assessing its
effectiveness, especially considering the quickness with which experimental protocols proceed in
most laboratory settings. More recent research by Critcher, Dunning, and Armor (2010),
however, suggests that affirmation manipulations are most effective when they precede the threat
(or at least precede the defensive conclusion that results from a threat). In the current research,
the presentation order of threat and affirmation were counterbalanced to assess if this variable
moderates the effectiveness of the manipulation.
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STUDY 1
Study 1 serves as an initial test of whether affirming the collective self can bolster the
self-concept and reduce bias in the face of a threat to the individual self. Specifically, it examines
the effects of both self-affirmation and group-affirmation on the tendency of participants to
respond defensively to poor performances on a word association test. It also directly tests the
impact of self- and group-affirmation on participants’ self-esteem following this individual-level
threat.
Defensiveness in the context of task performance can be conceptualized in several ways.
One way is through the expression of self-serving attributional biases. People tend to make selfserving causal attributions for success and failure, such that when they succeed or perform well,
they attribute their performances to internal causes, whereas when they fail or perform poorly,
they attribute the outcome to external factors not under their control (Campbell & Sedikides,
1999). For example, following a poor task performance, people are more likely to attribute that
performance to factors such as luck and task difficulty than to factors such as their own
individual ability and effort (Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976). Defensiveness can also be
conceptualized as the extent to which an individual “disengages” him/herself from the poor task
performance. When feeling defensive after a threat, people tend to distance themselves from the
threatening domain and report that performing well on such tasks is not an important component
of who they are as individuals (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998). Finally,
poor task performance can result in the experience of defensive mental states. “Challenge” and
“threat,” for instance, are motivational states that reflect one’s perceptions of situational demands
and personal resources in a given evaluative context (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Blascovich,
Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001). When an individual perceives demands as
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outweighing resources, a threat experience results, whereas when personal resources meet or
exceed situational demands, a challenge experience results. Thus, when feeling defensive,
individuals may experience more threat-related motivations and less challenge-related
motivations. The current study assesses whether self-affirmation and group-affirmation can
mitigate these defensive response tendencies.
Group-Affirmation Selection Process
The specific social identities to be affirmed in Study 1 were determined, in part, by the
results of a pilot study in which undergraduate students from a participant pool were asked to
indicate the most important groups to which they belonged. The results revealed that political
party membership was the social identity selected most frequently behind only athletic team
affiliation. Given the accessibility of political partisans on a college campus and the applicability
of political affiliation to a broad range of people (as opposed to identification with a particular
team or sport), political identity was selected as a group-affirmation context.
However, it could be argued that political affiliation is a unique social identity such that it
is, by its very nature, divisive and bias-ridden (Ware, 2011). In fact, just the act of thinking about
politics has been shown to increase peoples’ feelings of threat, hostility, and defensiveness
(Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015). It is quite possible, then, that affirming a political identity may
behave differently from affirming other more “neutral” social identities. Because of this, a
second group identity was introduced into the Study 1 protocol to ascertain if any potential
group-affirmation effects are due to the nature of the group being affirmed or to the groupaffirmation process more generally. The second social identity selected was national identity
(e.g., “American”). The purpose of selecting this identity was to use a group membership that a
wide range of participants would be able to identify with, but one that would not necessarily
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have the potential to activate the hostility and bias so characteristic of the political context. Thus,
participants in Study 1 completed either a self-affirmation task, a political party-affirmation task,
a nationality-affirmation task, or a non-affirming control task.
Hypotheses
Based on previous research documenting a reduction in defensiveness following selfaffirmation (e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2002), it was hypothesized that participants who affirmed
the individual self would be less likely to make defensive attributions for their poor
performances on a word association task than participants who did not affirm at all. Specifically,
it was predicted that self-affirmation would increase the tendency of participants to attribute their
performances to the internal factors of individual ability and effort and decrease their tendency to
attribute performances to the external factors of luck and task difficulty. Additionally, it was
hypothesized that participants who affirmed the self would experience less threat-related
emotions and more challenge-related emotions following the threat, report more engagement
with the task domain, and demonstrate higher levels of self-esteem (a boost to their overall
feelings of self-worth), relative to those who did not affirm.
Due to the lack of research exploring the link between group-affirmation and individuallevel processes, no specific hypotheses were made regarding the effects of group-affirmation on
performance attributions, challenge/threat, task engagement, and self-esteem. Based, on the “ingroup as a social resource” model (Correll & Park, 2005), it could be predicted that affirming the
group might behave in a similar fashion as affirming the self with respect to individual level
biases. However, because the collective self is not primary (Gaertner et al., 2002), groupaffirmation may not be as effective as affirming the self at countering individual-level threats.
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Method
Participants and Design
A total of 415 undergraduate students in an introductory psychology course received
partial course credit for participating in this study. The sample consisted of 262 women and 153
men aged 18 to 30 (M = 18.64, SD = 1.13). In terms of race/ethnicity, 76.4% of the sample
identified as White, 8.9% as Asian, 5.3% as Black, 5.1% as Hispanic, 0.5% as Native American,
and 0.5% as Pacific Islander. Another 3.1% identified as another race or as mixed race. Nearly
all participants spoke English as a first language (95.3%).1
Participants were randomly assigned to either the self-affirmation, nationalityaffirmation, political party-affirmation, or non-affirmation (control) condition. This resulted in
104 participants being assigned to the self-affirmation condition, 105 participants to the
nationality-affirmation condition, 104 to the political party-affirmation condition, and 102 to the
non-affirmation condition. Sample size was determined using the general guideline of 100
participants per condition/cell, which results in 80% power to detect an effect size of d = .40 (the
average effect size in social/personality psychology; see Funder et al., 2014).
Procedure and Measures
Participants completed an online questionnaire containing four sections. The first section
consisted of informed consent and general demographic questions. The second section consisted
of the affirmation manipulation. The third section consisted of the word-association task and
self-threatening feedback, and the fourth section consisted of the reaction and attribution
measures. These sections are described below.
Importantly, the presentation order of the affirmation manipulation task and the selfthreatening task (the second and third sections) was counterbalanced across participants.

23
Affirmation Manipulation. Participants in the self-affirmation condition and the two
group-affirmation conditions completed the standard values-affirmation task adapted from
previous research (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Gunn & Wilson,
2011). Participants were presented with 13 values (e.g., “Art/music,” “Social life,” “Concern for
others”). Participants in the self-affirmation condition were asked to select the value that they
thought was most important to them as individuals and to write a paragraph explaining how that
value pertained to them and why they thought it was so important. Participants in the groupaffirmation conditions were asked to select the value that they thought was most important to
either their nationality or political party as a group. They were then instructed to write a
paragraph explaining how that value pertained to their group and why members of that group
thought it was important. Participants in the non-affirmation (control) condition were asked to
list everything they had eaten or drank in the previous 48 hours. The non-affirmation instructions
were taken from Cohen et al., who argue that participants can turn any values-based task (such as
writing about an un-important value) into a self-affirming task and, thus, something completely
irrelevant and arbitrary should be used as a control. The full text of the affirmation manipulation
can be found in Appendix A.
Self-Threatening Task. All participants completed a difficult version of the Remote
Associates Test (RAT; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984), which is a word association task
consisting of ten trials. For each trial, participants were presented with a series of three stimulus
words and asked to think of a fourth word that, when combined with each of the stimulus words,
resulted in word pairs that made up common compound words or phrases. In one trial, for
example, participants were presented with the words “reading,” “service,” and “stick.” The
correct answer for this item was “lip” because it could have been combined with each of the
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stimulus words to create a new compound word/phrase (“lip reading,” “lip service,” and
“lipstick”). Instructions for the RAT and all items that were used can be found in Appendix B.
After completing all ten trials, participants were given their actual scores on the test (e.g., “You
got three out of ten questions correct”).
Because of the difficulty of the RAT (and anticipated poor performance of the
participants), the process of completing the test and receiving performance feedback was
intended to be a source of threat.2 This task was selected specifically because it allowed
participants’ self-concepts to be threatened without any deception or presentation of
misinformation (as the performance feedback was accurate). The RAT used in this study was
compiled by selecting three items categorized as easy and seven items categorized as difficult by
McFarlan and Blascovich (1984). This was done to prevent participants from being completely
overwhelmed by the difficulty of the task (as would likely be the case if all ten of the items were
categorized as difficult).
Dependent Measures. Following the affirmation procedure and self-threatening task, all
participants completed a series of dependent measures assessing their reactions to the RAT. One
set of dependent measures assessed participants’ task performance attributions. Specifically,
participants were presented with four possible causes that may have contributed to their
performance on the RAT: Their effort, their ability, luck, and the difficulty of the task (see
Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976). They then ranked these factors in the order in which they
thought they had a significant impact on their performance (with a value of 1 being assigned to
the most impactful factor and a value of 4 being assigned to the least impactful factor).
Additionally, each of these primary factors was broken down into two separate unipolar subfactors, resulting in eight attributional items (“Good luck,” “Bad luck,” “The task being easy,”
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“The task being difficult,” “Ability to do well,” “Inability to do well,” “Putting in a lot of effort,”
“Not putting in a lot of effort”). On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), participants were
asked to indicate the extent to which they thought that their performance was determined by each
of these sub-factors.
Participants also completed a series of measures assessing their emotional reactions,
engagement with the task domain, and state self-esteem following the RAT. Emotional reactions
were assessed with a measure of participants’ experiences of challenge- and threat-related
emotions (see Blascovich et al., 2001). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which
they felt three emotions related to a challenge motivational state (“Eager,” “Hopeful,” “Excited”)
and three emotions related to a threat motivational state (“Fearful,” “Worried,” “Anxious”) on a
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Participants’ responses for the challenge emotions and
threat emotions were averaged to produce one overall challenge variable (α = .74) and one
overall threat variable (α = .82).
Engagement with the task domain was assessed with the disengagement subscale of the
Intellectual Orientation Inventory (IOI; Major et al., 1998) which is a six-item measure assessing
the extent to which people disengage themselves from negative feedback on intelligence tests.
On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), participants indicated the extent to which they
agreed with statements such as, “Being good at tasks like this is an important part of who I am,”
and “Doing well on intelligence tasks like this is very important to me.” Participants’ responses
to these items were averaged to produce one overall task engagement variable (α = .76).
Finally, state self-esteem was assessed using Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale (with
the instructions adapted to indicate how participants felt “right now”). On a scale of 1 (not at all)
to 7 (very much so), participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with statements such
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as, “I take a positive attitude toward myself,” and “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.”
Participants’ responses to these items were averaged to produce one overall state self-esteem
variable (α = .85). The order of all dependent measures was counterbalanced. (See Appendices
C-F for a complete list of dependent measures.)
Analysis Plan
The primary analyses for Study 1 consisted of a series of one-way ANOVAs exploring
the effect of affirmation condition (self-affirmation vs. nationality-affirmation vs. political partyaffirmation vs. non-affirmation) on participants’ task performance attributions, challenge/threat
experiences, task domain engagement, and state self-esteem. Additionally, several exploratory
tests were run based on the results of these primary analyses.
Results
RAT Performance
As intended, participants generally performed poorly on the RAT (M = 2.89; SD = 1.95).
Nevertheless, a small number of participants performed well. Those who did well presumably
would not experience the intended self-esteem threat and, thus, would have little need to engage
in self-serving attributions or disengage from the task. Thus, participants who correctly answered
eight or more of the ten items correctly (n = 14) were removed from subsequent analyses. Of the
remaining 401 participants, 99 had been randomly assigned to the non-affirmation condition, 102
to the self-affirmation condition, 102 to the nationality-affirmation condition, and 98 to the
political party-affirmation condition.
Affirmed Values
There was some variation across affirmation condition in terms of the specific values that
participants chose to write about. The majority of participants who self-affirmed (n = 102)
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selected either “Family” (37.3%) or “Relationships” (15.7%) as their most important value. The
next most-selected values were “Honesty” (9.8%) and “Independence” (8.8%), with all other
values being selected by less than five percent of those who self-affirmed. Participants who
affirmed their nationality (n = 102) tended to affirm on either “Family” (32.4%) or
“Independence” (25.5%). The next most-selected values for these participants were “Physical
Attractiveness” (8.8%), “Social Life” (7.8%), and “Relationships” (6.9%). Finally, for
participants who affirmed their political party, there was a dichotomy between those who
identified as Democrats and those who identified as Republicans. For Democratic participants
who affirmed their party (n = 70), a majority selected “Concern for Others” (55.5%) as their
party’s most important value. The next most-selected values were “Independence” (15.7%) and
“Social Life” (7.1%). For Republican participants (n = 28), a majority selected “Independence”
(53.6%) as their party’s most important value, with “Family” (17.9%) and “Religion/Spirituality”
(17.9%) being the next most-selected values.
Task Performance Attributions
Correlations among each of the individual performance attribution measures can be found
in Table 1. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to examine the effects of
affirmation condition on the extent to which participants attributed their performance on the
RAT to specific internal and external factors (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations
within each condition).
Overall, participants tended to attribute their performance on the RAT to the task being
difficult (M = 4.82, SD = 1.46) to a greater extent than to the task being easy (M = 2.21, SD =
1.20), their ability to do well (M = 3.48, SD = 1.47), their inability to do well (M = 3.80, SD =
1.53), their effort (M = 3.33, SD = 1.41), their lack of effort (M = 3.45, SD = 1.57), good luck (M
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= 2.12, SD = 1.33), and bad luck (M = 2.43, SD = 1.45). Importantly, there was no difference
across affirmation conditions for any of these performance attributions: the task being difficult
(F(3, 397) = .92, p = .43), ), the task being easy (F(3, 397) = .90, p = .44), participants’ ability
(F(3, 397) = .15, p = .93), participants’ lack of ability (F(3, 397) = 1.40, p = .24), participants’
effort (F(3, 397) = 1.40, p = .24), participants’ lack of effort (F(3, 397) = 1.22, p = .30), good
luck (F(3, 397) = .89, p = .45), and bad luck (F(3, 397) = .32, p = .81).
This trend played out with the attribution rankings as well, with task difficulty being
ranked most impactful overall (M = 1.79, SD = .92), followed by effort (M = 2.34, SD = .95),
ability (M = 2.35, SD = .96), and luck (M = 3.52, SD = .87). There was also no difference across
affirmation conditions for participants’ rankings of these four primary attributions: task difficulty
(F(3, 397) = 1.48, p = .22), ability (F(3, 397) = .78, p = .51), effort (F(3, 397) = .50, p = .69), and
luck (F(3, 397) = 1.59, p = .19).
Challenge/Threat, Task Engagement, and Self-Esteem
Correlations among challenge emotions, threat emotions, task engagement, and state selfesteem following the self-threatening task can be found in Table 3. A GLM procedure was used
to examine the effects of affirmation condition on each of these variables (see Table 4 for means
and standard deviations within each condition).
There was no difference across affirmation condition for participant experiences of
challenge-related emotions, (F(3, 397) = 1.23, p = .30), or threat-related emotions, (F(3, 397) =
.97, p = .41). There also was no difference across affirmation condition for task engagement,
(F(3, 397) = 1.55, p = .20). Overall, participants did not experience much challenge (M = 2.80,
SD = 1.30) or threat-related emotions (M = 2.57, SD = 1.42) after completing the RAT.
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Participants also reported feeling relatively disengaged from the task domain (M = 2.98, SD =
1.19). These descriptive statistics reflect responses on a seven-point scale.
For state self-esteem, however, there was a significant difference across affirmation
conditions, F(3, 397) = 2.86, p = .037, η2partial = .021. Contrast analyses revealed that this pattern
was driven by participants in the self-affirmation condition (see Figure 1). Participants who selfaffirmed (M = 5.46, SD = .94) reported significantly higher levels of state self-esteem than
participants who affirmed their political party (M = 5.04, SD = 1.06; F(1, 397) = 8.27, p = .004,
η2partial = .02). Self-affirmed participants also reported marginally higher levels of state selfesteem than those who affirmed their nationality (M = 5.19, SD = 1.08; F(1, 397) = 3.53, p =
.061, η2partial = .01) and those who were not affirmed at all (M = 5.21, SD = 1.05; F(1, 397) =
2.92, p = .089, η2partial = .007). Finally, participants who self-affirmed reported significantly
higher levels of state self-esteem compared to participants in all other conditions combined, F(1,
397) = 7.01, p = .008, η2partial = .017.
The state self-esteem of participants in the two group-affirmation conditions did not
differ significantly from one another, F(1, 397) = 1.03, p = .31. Additionally, participants who
group-affirmed did not differ from those who were not affirmed at all, F(1, 397) = .59, p = .45).
Thus, although self-affirmation protected participants’ self-esteem following a threat to the
individual self, affirming a group identity (either nationality or political party) did not have this
same buffering effect.
Affirmation/Threat Order
The previous analyses were re-run with affirmation-threat order included as a potential
moderator. The order in which participants completed the affirmation manipulation (before or
after the self-threating task) did not have an impact on task performance attributions,
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threat/challenge emotions, task engagement, or self-esteem. Order also did not moderate the
effect of affirmation condition on any of the dependent measures.
Exploratory Analyses
Because the comparison between participants in the self-affirmation condition and those
in the other affirmation conditions produced a distinct pattern with respect to self-esteem, this
relationship was further analyzed with several exploratory tests. Specifically, after examining the
pattern of means for each dependent variable, the comparison between self-affirmed participants
and all other participants was tested for the task engagement variable. Although there was no
omnibus effect of affirmation condition on engagement ratings, contrast analyses revealed that
participants who self-affirmed reported less engagement with the task domain than participants
in all other conditions combined, F(1, 397) = 4.53, p = .034, η2partial = .011).
From this analysis, the link between task engagement and self-esteem, based on
affirmation condition, was explored. Specifically, it was hypothesized that, when comparing selfaffirmed participants to all other participants, task engagement might mediate the relationship
between affirmation condition and state self-esteem. A simple mediation analysis using Hayes’
(2013) PROCESS macro was used to test this pattern. As can be seen in Figure 2, participants in
the self-affirmation condition reported being less engaged with the RAT performance domain
than participants in all other affirmation conditions (b = .29, t(399) = 2.13, p = .034, 95% C.I.
[0.02, 0.56]). Additionally, controlling for affirmation condition, the less engagement
participants expressed, the greater was their state self-esteem, (b = -.28, t(398) = -6.75, p < .001,
95% C.I. [-0.36, -0.20]). A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (b
= -.08, SE = .04) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples did not include zero (-0.17 to -0.004). The
direct effect of affirmation condition on self-esteem remained significant, however, (b = -.23,
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t(398) = -2.05, p = .041, 95% C.I. [-0.45, -0.01]). Thus, task disengagement partially mediated
the effect of self-affirmation (compared to all other conditions) on participant state self-esteem.
Discussion
Study 1 explores the previously untested question of whether affirming the collective
level of identity can counter threats and reduce bias at the individual level of identity. This was
not found to be the case. In terms of attributional biases, neither self-affirmation nor groupaffirmation affected the extent to which participants attributed self-threatening task performances
to internal (ability, effort) or external (luck, task difficulty) factors. Additionally, affirmation
condition did not have an overall effect on participants’ experience of challenge or threat-related
emotions. The lack of an affirmation effect on task attributions was especially surprising given
the wealth of research demonstrating the effectiveness of self-affirmation at mitigating selfserving biases (McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2002). It may be the case that the
RAT was simply too difficult to elicit any variation in attributions across conditions. On both the
specific attribution items and the rank-ordering of importance, participants across the board
indicated that task difficulty was the most important determinant in how they performed. Thus,
task difficulty may have overwhelmed any affirmation effect that may have been taking place.
However, there was an overall effect of affirmation condition on participants’ self-esteem
following the threat. This effect was driven by self-affirmation, such that the self-esteem of selfaffirmed participants was buffered following the threat, whereas those who affirmed a group
identity (or did not affirm at all) did not exhibit a self-esteem boost. Thus, there was a
discrepancy between the process of affirming the individual self and the process of affirming the
collective self. Self-affirmation protected self-esteem from an individual-level threat, whereas
group-affirmation did not. This pattern supports my underlying hypothesis that affirming the self
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and affirming the group are theoretically distinct processes, and suggests that group-affirmation
may not be an effective means of protecting the individual self from threat. Additionally, because
the collective self is not “primary” (Gaertner et al., 2002), affirming at that level of identity may
not produce an effect that is potent enough to translate to the individual level of identity (as is the
case when one self-affirms to counter group-level threats).
Finally, exploratory analyses were run assessing the relationship between selfaffirmation, task engagement, and self-esteem. When comparing self-affirmation to all other
affirmation conditions, it was found that engagement partially mediated the effect of selfaffirmation on state self-esteem. Participants that self-affirmed became less engaged with the
self-threatening task domain than those who did not self-affirm, and this resulted in higher levels
of state self-esteem. This pattern of results does not support the hypothesis that affirming the self
reduces defensiveness by leading participants to become more engaged with the threatening task
domain. However, this finding does make sense within the context of recent research on the
cognitive mechanisms underlying self-affirmation. Critcher and Dunning (2015), for instance,
argue that self-affirmation “works” because it expands the working self-concept and reduces
focus on the threatened domain, thus allowing one’s sense of self-worth to realign with a broader
dispositional view of the self. Less task engagement could be a manifestation of this broadening
process. It should be emphasized, however, that these analyses were exploratory in nature, and
thus need to replicated before a definitive conclusion can be drawn. Additionally, because these
data are cross-sectional, and the order of the dependent variables was counterbalanced, one
cannot be certain whether this model reflects the true causal path.
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STUDY 2
Whereas Study 1 tests whether affirming the collective self can bolster self-esteem and
reduce bias at the individual level of identity, Study 2 addresses the question of whether
affirming the group can reduce bias while still operating at the collective level of identity.
According to my theoretical model of the collective self, this might be the case if a reduction in
bias corresponds with the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, behavioral tendencies) that
define or are otherwise pertinent to the specific group identity that is affirmed. For example, in
the context of American political parties, it might be considered a part of one’s party identity to
possess favorable, benevolent attitudes towards some groups of people and unfavorable, hostile
attitudes towards others. For instance, it might be part of one’s Republican identity to view
Palestinians or undocumented immigrants negatively but Israelis or gun enthusiasts positively.
On the other hand, it might be a part of one’s Democratic identity to demonstrate the opposite
attitudinal pattern. Thus, although people may have a general tendency to be hostile and biased
when operating in a group-level mind-set, I argue that these tendencies can be kept in check if
there is a group-based norm in place that promotes positivity.
Study 2 was designed to test whether affirming one’s political identity can decrease
collective-level bias, as defined by a greater expression of favorable attitudes towards out-groups
one’s political party is “supposed” to view favorably, following a group-level threat. If groupaffirmation activates the psychological attributes associated with the affirmed identity, then those
positive attitudes towards favorable out-groups should be more prevalent for those that groupaffirm than those that do not. Additionally, Study 2 tests whether a group-affirmation procedure
can also increase group-level bias, as defined by a decrease in the expression of favorable
attitudes towards out-groups one’s political party is not “supposed” to view favorably, following
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a threat. Thus, group-affirmation should simultaneously decrease and increase out-group biases
based on what is prescribed by one’s political identity.
Out-Group Selection Pilot Study
In order to determine which groups of people the Republican and Democratic parties find
to be more and less favorable, and thus which groups would be used as the out-groups in Study
2, a pilot study was conducted. In this study, a sample of political partisans was presented with a
list of groups (e.g., Evangelical Christians, Muslims, illegal immigrants, police officers) and
asked to indicate how favorably they viewed members of those groups on a scale from 1 (not at
all favorably) to 7 (extremely favorably). The list of groups was taken from Chambers,
Schlenker, and Collisson’s (2013) analysis of political intolerance. They argue that there are
certain groups which people tend to identify as being more liberal-leaning or conservativeleaning, and that people tend to be less tolerant of those groups that they perceive as leaning
towards the opposing political ideology.
Group selection was based on two criteria. First, there needed to be sufficient spread
between Republican and Democratic participants’ ratings of the group in the pilot study. In
practice, this meant that favorability ratings needed to be above the mid-point for participants
from one party and below the mid-point for participants from the other party in order to be
considered “favorable” and “unfavorable,” respectively. Additionally, the selected groups needed
to be considered out-groups by most potential participants. For instance, although “people who
are pro-choice” received highly polarized ratings, it was likely that any sample collected for
Study 2 would include a substantial proportion of people that consider themselves pro-choice.
Thus, that group was not selected.
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From this list of groups, four were chosen to be included as the out-groups in Study 2.
Two of those groups were Republican-leaning: police/law-enforcement officers and gun-rights
activists. Two of those groups were Democratic-leaning: welfare recipients and
undocumented/illegal immigrants.
Hypotheses
Participants in Study 2 were presented with a group-threatening stimulus (an article
presenting threatening information about the political party with which they identified) and either
affirmed the self, affirmed their political party, or did not affirm at all. They then completed a
series of measures assessing their attitudes towards the favorable and unfavorable out-groups
selected in the pilot study. Finally, the individual-level factors of challenge/threat experiences
and state self-esteem were assessed following the threat and affirmation.
In order to capture a broad swath of participants’ overall attitudes towards the out-groups,
three distinct constructs were assessed: positive and negative emotional reactions towards outgroup members, general evaluations (e.g., positive versus negative) of out-group members, and
prosocial behavioral intentions towards out-group members. Additionally, because a number of
studies have shown that group identification predicts greater levels of intergroup bias (e.g.,
Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015), participants’ identification with
their political party was also assessed.
Based on previous research documenting the power of self-affirmation to reduce
collective-level biases (e.g., Sherman & Kim, 2005), it was hypothesized that participants who
affirmed the self would demonstrate an increase in positive emotional reactions, evaluations, and
behavioral intentions towards members of all four out-groups, regardless of their own political
affiliation. Thus, even for out-groups with which they are “supposed” to view unfavorably, the
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general bias-reducing effect of self-affirmation should make participants view them more
positively. Crucially, however, it was hypothesized that participants who affirmed their political
party would show a boost in positive attitudes only towards members of the groups they are
“supposed” to have favorable attitudes towards (based on their political affiliation). In fact, it
was predicted that participants who group-affirmed would demonstrate a decrease in positivity
towards unfavorable out-groups. Additionally, it was hypothesized that political party
identification would moderate any effect of affirmation condition on out-group attitudes.
Finally, as was the case with the individual-level threat from Study 1, it was hypothesized
that those who self-affirmed would exhibit higher levels of state self-esteem (a boost to their
overall feelings of self-worth) following the group-level threat, whereas those who groupaffirmed (or did not affirm at all) would not show this boost.
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 533 participants took part in Study 2. This sample size was based on a formal
power analysis that accounted for the inclusion of a continuous-level moderating variable (viz.,
party identification). Rather than relying on the general recommendation of Funder et al. (2015)
to recruit 100 participants per cell, GPower was used to determine an appropriate sample size.
With one three-level factor (affirmation: control, self, group) and one continuous moderator
(party identification), and assuming a small effect size for the affirmation by identification
interaction (η2partial = .02), a sample size of roughly 480 would be required to achieve .80 power
for this design. In order to guard against loss of data due to partial completion of the survey, total
recruitment was set to include an additional 50 participants.
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In an effort to get a diverse sample, participants were recruited from both a university
participant pool and from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The sample consisted of 129
undergraduate students in an introductory psychology course and 404 Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers currently residing in the United States. Undergraduate participants received partial
course credit for participating, whereas Mechanical Turk workers received $1. Overall, 268 men
and 265 women aged 18 to 74 (M = 31.87, SD = 12.10) participated. In terms of race/ethnicity,
77.7% of the sample identified as White, 9.6% as Asian, 6.0% as Hispanic, 4.7% as Black, 0.9%
as Native American, and 0.2% as Pacific Islander. Another 0.9% identified as another race or as
mixed race. Nearly all participants were United States citizens (96.6%) and spoke English as a
first language (95.3%).
Participants were randomly assigned to either the self-affirmation, political partyaffirmation, or non-affirmation (control) condition. This resulted in 174 participants being
assigned to the self-affirmation condition, 168 participants to the political party-affirmation
condition, and 191 to the non-affirmation condition.
Procedure and Measures
Participants completed an online questionnaire containing four sections. The first section
consisted of informed consent, general demographic questions, and a measure of political party
identification. The second section consisted of the affirmation manipulation. The third section
consisted of the group-threatening stimulus, and the fourth section consisted of the out-group
evaluation measures. These sections are described below.
Importantly, the presentation order of the affirmation manipulation and group-threatening
information (the second and third sections) was counterbalanced across participants.

38
Political Party Identification. Participants first indicated whether they were a Democrat,
a Republican, or an Independent. If participants indicated that they were Independents, they were
asked if they saw themselves as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party. This selection of
political party affiliation determined which political party was threatened as well which outgroups were classified as favorable and unfavorable for each participant. Overall there were a
total of 248 Democrats, 116 Republicans, and 169 Independents. When Independents were
collapsed across the party in which they felt closest to, the final sample consisted of 351
Democrats and 182 Republicans.
Additionally, as an index of party identification, participants were asked to indicate how
strongly they identified with both the Republican and Democratic parties on a seven-point scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Affirmation Manipulation. The affirmation procedure was identical to that of Study 1
for participants in the self-affirmation condition, political party-affirmation condition, and nonaffirmation (control) condition. The nationality-affirmation condition was not central to the
current set of hypotheses and thus was not included in Study 2.
Group-Threatening Information. All participants read a brief article summarizing the
results of a recent study that assessed the relative intelligence of Democrats and Republicans.
Participants read that, using a variety of tests, analysts from an independent research group found
that their political party was less intelligent than the opposing party. They also read that this
difference was quite significant and held up even when controlling for demographic factors such
as race, gender, age, and socioeconomic status (see Appendix G for the full text of the article).
The article was taken from an online source (Last, 2015) and edited slightly for content,
grammar, and flow. Democratic and Republican participants read articles that were identical in
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content, except for the name of the political party described as less intelligent. Democratic
participants read that Democrats were less intelligent, whereas Republican participants read that
Republicans were less intelligent. This threat-inducing method was chosen because it focused on
a specific aspect of participants’ political identities (their group’s intelligence), thus providing an
avenue for them to affirm a different, unrelated dimension of their political identities.
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that receiving negative feedback about the intelligence of
one’s group as a whole is a reliable way to induce a threat response from individual members
(Hunter, Platow, Bell, & Kypri, 1997; Martiny, Kessler, & Vignoles, 2011).
Dependent Measures. Following the affirmation manipulation and group-threatening
stimulus, all participants completed a series of dependent measures assessing their attitudes
towards the four out-groups that were determined by the group-selection pilot test: police/law
enforcement officers, gun-rights activists, people on welfare, and undocumented/illegal
immigrants. For each of the four out-groups, these measures consisted of items assessing specific
emotional reactions towards members of that out-group, a general out-group evaluation measure,
and a measure of behavioral intentions towards that out-group.
Out-group emotional reactions were assessed with the group-based Anger/Fear/Respect
Index (Mackie et al., 2000; Rey et al., 2008). For this measure, participants indicated the extent
to which they felt various negative emotions (e.g., “Afraid,” “Furious”) and positive emotions
(e.g., “Admiring,” “Appreciative”) towards members of each out-group on a scale ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).3 Participants’ responses for the negative emotions and the
positive emotions were averaged for each group producing eight outcome variables: negative
emotions regarding police/law-enforcement officers (α = .94), positive emotions regarding
police/law-enforcement officers (α = .90), negative emotions regarding gun-rights activists (α =
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.96), positive emotions regarding gun-rights activists (α = .92), negative emotions regarding
welfare recipients (α = .91), positive emotions regarding welfare recipients (α = .90), negative
emotions regarding undocumented/illegal immigrants (α = .94), and positive emotions regarding
undocumented/illegal immigrants (α = .89).
General out-group evaluations were assessed with a six-item measure adapted from Voci
and Hewstone (2003). Participants rated their general attitudes towards each out-group on
several evaluative dimensions using a 7-point semantic differential scale (e.g., “cold-warm,”
“positive-negative,” “hostile-friendly”). Participants’ ratings were averaged for each group
producing four outcome variables: police/law enforcement officer evaluations (α = .95), gunrights activist evaluations (α = .96), welfare recipient evaluations (α = .94), and
undocumented/illegal immigrant evaluations (α = .96).
Finally, behavioral intentions towards out-group members were assessed with a 5-item
measure adapted from Husnu and Crisp (2010). On a scale ranging from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7
(highly likely), participants indicated the likelihood that they would engage in various contactpromoting behaviors with members of each out-group in the near future. Such behaviors
included interacting with members of those groups and donating money to organizations that
support those groups. Participants’ responses to the behavioral items were averaged for each
group producing four outcome variables: behavior towards police/law enforcement officers (α =
.89), behavior towards gun-rights activists (α = .89), behavior towards welfare recipients (α =
.88), and behavior towards undocumented/illegal immigrants (α = .90). A full list of the outgroup attitudinal measures can be found in Appendices H-J.
Participants also completed the same challenge/threat reaction scale and state self-esteem
scale from Study 1. Participants’ responses for the challenge emotions, threat emotions, and state
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self-esteem were averaged to produce one overall challenge variable (α = .84), one overall threat
variable (α = .86), and one overall self-esteem variable (α = .94). The presentation order of all
dependent measures was counterbalanced across participants.
Analysis Plan
The primary analyses for Study 2 consisted of a series of general linear model (GLM)
procedures testing the effects of affirmation condition (self-affirmation vs. political partyaffirmation vs. non-affirmation), political party identification (a centered continuous variable),
and the Affirmation X Identification interaction on participants’ emotional reactions, general
evaluations, and behavioral intentions towards favorable and unfavorable out-groups. Regression
analyses were then run to break down any interaction effects at low and high levels of party
identification. Additionally, one-way ANOVAs exploring the effect of affirmation condition on
participants’ challenge/threat experiences and state self-esteem were also conducted.
Results
Affirmed Values
As was the case in Study 1, there was some variation across affirmation condition in
terms of the specific values that participants chose to write about. The majority of participants
who self-affirmed (n = 174) selected either “Family” (27.6%), “Independence” (15.5%) or
“Relationships” (12.1%) as their most important value. The next most-selected values were
“Honesty” (8.0%) “Art/Music” (7.5%) and “Sense of Humor” (7.5%), with all other values being
selected by less than five percent of those who self-affirmed. For participants who affirmed their
political party, there was a dichotomy between those who identified as Democrats and those who
identified as Republicans. For Democratic participants who affirmed their party (n = 106), a
majority selected “Concern for Others” (70.8%) as their party’s most important value. The next
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most-selected values were “Independence” (10.4%) and “Social Life” (5.7%). For Republican
participants (n = 62), a majority selected either “Independence” (33.9%) or “Family” (24.2%) as
their party’s most important value, with “Religion/Spirituality” (17.7%) being the next mostselected value.
Out-Group Attitudinal Measures
For each out-group attitudinal measure (negative emotions, positive emotions, general
evaluations, and behavioral intentions), participants’ responses were averaged for the two groups
that their political party views as favorable and the two groups that their party views as
unfavorable. Thus, for Republican participants, responses for police/law-enforcement officers
and gun-rights activists were averaged to create favorable group measures, and responses for
welfare recipients and undocumented/illegal immigrants were averaged to create unfavorable
group measures. This resulted in a total of eight variables assessing participants’ attitudes
towards out-groups: negative emotions towards unfavorable groups, negative emotions towards
favorable groups, positive emotions towards unfavorable groups, positive emotions towards
favorable groups, general evaluations of unfavorable groups, general evaluations of favorable
groups, behavioral intentions towards unfavorable groups, and behavioral intentions towards
favorable groups.4 Correlations among each of these variables can be found in Table 5.
Out-Group Emotions. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to examine
the effects of affirmation condition (Affirmation: self, group, control), political party
identification (Identification: centered continuous predictor), and the Affirmation X
Identification interaction on participants’ emotional reactions towards members of favorable outgroups and unfavorable out-groups. Analyses were run separately for favorable groups and
unfavorable groups as well as for negative emotions and positive emotions.
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For the negative emotions towards unfavorable groups, only the party identification main
effect was significant, F(1, 527) = 13.83, p < .001, η2partial = .026. Overall, the more participants
identified with their political party, the stronger their negative emotional reactions towards
unfavorable out-group members. There was not a significant affirmation condition main effect,
F(2, 527) = 1.14, p = .32, nor a significant interaction between party identification and
affirmation condition, F(2, 527) = .88, p = .42. For the negative emotions towards favorable
groups, the party identification main effect, F(1, 527) = 1.28, p = .24, affirmation condition main
effect, F(2, 527) = .85, p = .43, and Identification x Affirmation interaction all failed to reach
significance, F(2, 527) = 1.32, p = .27.
For the positive emotions towards unfavorable groups, the party identification main effect
was marginally significant, F(1, 527) = 3.32, p = .069, η2partial = .006. There was not a significant
affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = .65, p = .52, nor a significant interaction between
party identification and affirmation condition, F(2, 527) = .53, p = .59.
For the positive emotions towards favorable groups, the party identification main effect
was significant, F(1, 527) = 14.01, p < .001, η2partial = .026. Overall, the more participants
identified with their political party, the stronger their positive emotional reactions towards group
members. There was also a significant affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = 6.40, p =
.002, η2partial = .024. This was qualified by a significant interaction between party identification
and affirmation condition, F(2, 527) = 6.18, p = .002, η2partial = .023.
In order to specify the precise pattern contributing to the overall interaction, a series of
regression analyses were run to examine the effects of affirmation condition (a between-subjects
factor) on positive emotions towards favorable out-group members at low and high levels of
political party identification (a continuous variable). High and low levels of identification were
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defined as one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. As shown in Figure 3,
the effect of party identification on positive group emotions was significant only for participants
in the non-affirmation condition, b = .36, SE = .07, t(527) = 5.17, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.22, 0.50].
There was no effect of identification on emotional reactions for participants in the selfaffirmation condition, b = .06, SE = .07, t(527) = .87, p = .39, or the political party-affirmation
condition, b = .05, SE = .08, t(527) = .63, p = .53. Additionally, the identification effect was
significantly stronger in the non-affirmation condition than in both the self-affirmation condition,
b = .30, SE = .10, t(527) = 3.05, p = .002, 95% C.I. [0.12, 0.49] and the party-affirmation
condition, b = .31, SE = .11, t(527) = 2.98, p = .003, 95% C.I. [0.11, 0.52]. The identification
effect in the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ significantly from one another, b
= .01, SE = .10, t(527) = .11, p = .92. Thus, only for participants who did not affirm, the more
they identified with their political party, the stronger their positive emotional reactions to
favorable out-groups.
Looking specifically at participants with low levels of party identification, the predicted
mean of positive emotional reactions was significantly lower in the non-affirmation condition
than in either the self-affirmation condition, b = .51, SE = .23, t(527) = 2.24, p = .026, 95% C.I.
[0.06, 0.95] or party-affirmation condition, b = .71, SE = .24, t(527) = 3.01, p = .003, 95% C.I.
[0.25, 1.17]. Predicted means for the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from
one another, b = .20, SE = .23, t(527) = .88, p = .38. At high levels of identification, the predicted
mean was significantly higher in the non-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation
condition, b = .46, SE = .22, t(527) = 2.03, p = .042, 95% C.I. [0.02, 0.90], but not the partyaffirmation condition, b = .29, SE = .23, t(527) = 1.25, p = .21. Once again, predicted means for
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the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one another, b = .17, SE = .24,
t(527) = .70, p = .49.
General Out-Group Evaluations. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to
examine the effects of affirmation condition (Affirmation: self, group, control), political party
identification (Identification: centered continuous predictor), and the Affirmation X
Identification interaction on participants’ general evaluations of members of favorable outgroups and unfavorable out-groups. Analyses were run separately for favorable groups and
unfavorable groups.
For the general evaluations towards unfavorable groups, neither the party identification
main effect, F(1, 527) = .73, p = .39, affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = 1.48, p = .23
nor Identification x Affirmation interaction were significant, F(2, 527) = 1.21, p = .30. For the
general evaluations towards favorable groups, however, the party identification main effect was
significant, F(1, 527) = 17.12, p < .001, η2partial = .031. Overall, the more participants identified
with their political party, the more favorable their out-group evaluations. There was also a
significant affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = 5.93, p = .003, η2partial = .022. This was
qualified by a significant interaction between party identification and affirmation condition, F(2,
527) = 5.73, p = .003, η2partial = .021.
In order to specify the precise pattern contributing to the overall interaction, a series of
regression analyses were run to examine the effects of affirmation condition (a between-subjects
factor) on general evaluations towards favorable out-group members at low and high levels of
political party identification (a continuous variable). High and low levels of identification were
defined as one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. As shown in Figure 4,
the effect of party identification on general evaluations was significant only for participants in
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the non-affirmation condition, b = .27, SE = .05, t(527) = 5.30, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.17, 0.37].
There was no effect of identification on evaluations for participants in the self-affirmation
condition, b = .06, SE = .05, t(527) = 1.19, p = .24, or the political party-affirmation condition, b
= .05, SE = .06, t(527) = .86, p = .39. Additionally, the identification effect was significantly
stronger in the non-affirmation condition than in both the self-affirmation condition, b = .21, SE
= .07, t(527) = 2.92, p = .004, 95% C.I. [0.07, 0.35] and the party-affirmation condition, b = .22,
SE = .08, t(527) = 2.89, p = .004, 95% C.I. [0.07, 0.37]. The identification effect in the self- and
party-affirmation conditions did not differ significantly from one another, b = .01, SE = .08,
t(527) = .15, p = .88. Thus, only for participants who did not affirm, the more they identified
with their political party, the more positive their evaluations of favorable out-groups.
Looking specifically at participants with low levels of party identification, the predicted
mean of general evaluations was significantly lower in the non-affirmation condition than in
either the self-affirmation condition, b = .33, SE = .16, t(527) = 2.04, p = .042, 95% C.I. [0.01,
0.66] or party-affirmation condition, b = .51, SE = .17, t(527) = 2.98, p = .003, 95% C.I. [0.17,
0.84]. Predicted means for the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one
another, b = .17, SE = .17, t(527) = 1.03, p = .30. At high levels of identification, the predicted
mean was significantly higher in the non-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation
condition, b = .33, SE = .16, t(527) = 2.04, p = .042, 95% C.I. [0.01, 0.65], but not the partyaffirmation condition, b = .20, SE = .17, t(527) = 1.16, p = .25. Once again, predicted means for
the self- and party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one another, b = .14, SE = .17,
t(527) = .79, p = .43.
Out-Group Behavioral Intentions. A general linear model (GLM) procedure was used
to examine the effects of affirmation condition (Affirmation: self, group, control), political party
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identification (Identification: centered continuous predictor), and the Affirmation X
Identification interaction on participants’ prosocial behavioral intentions towards members of
favorable out-groups and unfavorable out-groups. Analyses were run separately for favorable
groups and unfavorable groups.
For behavioral intentions towards unfavorable groups, neither the party identification
main effect, F(1, 527) = .01, p = .95, affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) = .75, p = .47
nor Identification x Affirmation interaction were significant, F(2, 527) = 1.17, p = .31. For
behavioral intentions towards favorable groups, however, the party identification main effect was
significant, F(1, 527) = 31.66, p < .001, η2partial = .057. Overall, the more participants identified
with their political party, the more favorable their behavioral intentions towards out-group
members. Although there was not a significant affirmation condition main effect, F(2, 527) =
2.26, p = .11, there was a significant interaction between party identification and affirmation
condition, F(2, 527) = 3.17, p = .043, η2partial = .012.
In order to specify the precise pattern contributing to the overall interaction, a series of
regression analyses were run to examine the effects of affirmation condition (a between-subjects
factor) on behavioral intentions towards favorable out-group members at low and high levels of
political party identification (a continuous variable). High and low levels of identification were
defined as one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. As shown in Figure 5,
the effect of party identification on behavioral intentions was significant for participants in the
non-affirmation condition, b = .34, SE = .06, t(527) = 5.41, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.22, 0.47], the
self-affirmation condition, b = .13, SE = .06, t(527) = 2.05, p = .04, 95% C.I. [0.006, 0.25]. and
the political party-affirmation condition, b = .17, SE = .07, t(527) = 2.39, p = .017, 95% C.I.
[0.03, 0.31]. However, the identification effect was significantly stronger in the non-affirmation
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condition than in the self-affirmation condition, b = .21, SE = .09, t(527) = 2.37, p = .017, 95%
C.I. [0.04, 0.39] and marginally stronger than in the party-affirmation condition, b = .18, SE =
.10, t(527) = 1.84, p = .067, 95% C.I. [-0.36, 0.01]. The identification effect in the self- and
party-affirmation conditions did not differ significantly from one another, b = .04, SE = .10,
t(527) = .41, p = .68. Thus, for all participants, the more they identified with their political party,
the stronger their prosocial behavioral intentions towards favorable out-groups. However, this
effect was stronger for those who did not affirm.
Looking specifically at participants with low levels of party identification, the predicted
mean of behavioral intentions in the non-affirmation condition was not significantly different
than the predicted means in either the self-affirmation condition, b = .13, SE = .21, t(527) = .63,
p = .53, or the party-affirmation condition, b = .34, SE = .21, t(527) = 1.58, p = .12. Predicted
means for the self- and party-affirmation conditions also did not differ from one another, b = .21,
SE = .21, t(527) = .99, p = .32. At high levels of identification, the predicted mean was
significantly higher in the non-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation condition, b =
.55, SE = .20, t(527) = 2.72, p = .007, 95% C.I. [0.15, 0.95], but not the party-affirmation
condition, b = .22, SE = .21, t(527) = 1.05, p = .29. Once again, predicted means for the self- and
party-affirmation conditions did not differ from one another, b = .33, SE = .22, t(527) = 1.53, p =
.13.
All of the previous analyses were re-run with affirmation/threat order included as a
potential moderator. It was found that the order in which participants completed the affirmation
manipulation (before or after the group-threating stimulus) did not have an impact on any of the
out-group attitudinal measures.
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Individual-Level Reactions and Order Effects
A GLM procedure was also used to examine the effects of affirmation condition on
participants’ experience of challenge and threat related emotions and state self-esteem following
the group-level threat (see Table 6 for means and standard deviations broken down by
condition).
There was no difference across affirmation condition for participant experiences of
challenge-related emotions, F(2, 530) = .81, p = .45, or threat-related emotions, F(2, 530) = 1.66,
p = .19.
Overall, there was no main effect of affirmation condition on participants’ state selfesteem, F(2, 527) = .92, p = 0.40. However, there was a marginally significant interaction
between self-esteem and presentation order, F(2, 527) = 2.87, p = 0.058, η2partial = 0.011). Simple
effects analyses revealed that this pattern was driven by participants in the self-affirmation
condition (see Figure 6). For participants who self-affirmed, those who affirmed before the threat
(M = 5.82, SD = 1.20) reported significantly higher levels of state self-esteem than those who
affirmed after the threat (M = 5.35, SD = 1.27; F(1, 527) = 5.02, p = .025). There was no such
effect of order for participants in either the non-affirmation condition, F(1, 527) = .54, p = .46, or
party-affirmation condition, F(1, 527) = 1.36, p = .24. Additionally, among those who affirmed
before the threat, there was a significant affirmation effect, such that those who affirmed the self
(M = 5.82, SD = 1.20) reported higher levels of self-esteem than those who affirmed their
political party (M = 5.27, SD = 1.44) or did not affirm at all (M = 5.57, SD = 1.29; F(2, 527) =
3.03, p = .033). There was no effect of affirmation condition on self-esteem among participants
who affirmed following the threat, F(2, 527) = .33, p = 0.72. Thus, although self-affirmation
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protected participants’ self-esteem following a threat to the collective self (although this effect
was marginal), affirming one’s political party identity did not have this same buffering effect.
Discussion
Study 2 tests whether group-affirmation can reduce collective-level biases if certain
unbiased attitudes are a core component of the affirmed group’s identity. Specifically, it tests the
hypothesis that, in contrast to affirming one’s individual self which should lead to a general
increase in positive attitudes towards all out-groups, regardless of political leaning, affirming
one’s political party identity should only lead to an increase in positivity towards out-groups
one’s party views favorably. Additionally, affirming one’s political party should lead to a
decrease in positivity towards out-groups one’s party views unfavorably. Partial support was
found for this hypothesis. Although affirmation condition did not affect participants’ attitudes
towards unfavorable out-groups, it did interact with political party identification to influence
positive emotional reactions, general evaluations, and prosocial behavioral intentions towards
favorable out-groups. Specifically, affirming the group boosted positive out-group attitudes,
particularly for those who did not identify strongly with their political party (although this effect
was much weaker for the measure of behavioral intentions). Thus, for those who affirmed their
political party, the relationship between party-identification and out-group attitudes was
weakened, such that all participants responded more like highly identified group members. A
similar bias-reducing pattern (although not quite as strong) was found for participants who selfaffirmed.
This finding of a general de-coupling of party-identification from positive out-group
attitudes following affirmation fits in with the notion that while affirming the self can lead to a
general reduction in bias, affirming the group can also reduce bias if it is a part of that group’s
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identity. However, the lack of an affirmation effect (or affirmation-identification interaction) on
participants’ attitudes towards unfavorable out-groups is surprising. In fact, there seemed to be a
lack of movement in general with respect to the unfavorable out-group attitudes such that even
the party-identification main effects were weak and inconsistent. This is somewhat unexpected,
especially given previous research documenting the hostility and negativity that tends to
characterize politically-relevant attitudes (e.g., Ware, 2011). One explanation is that participants
may have been hesitant to express negativity towards the specific out-groups used in this study
for fear of coming across as “politically incorrect” or “bigoted” (seeing as all of the groups are
associated with sensitive political issues). It also might be the case that, although attitudes
towards the favorable out-groups are a core component of one’s political identity (and thus can
be influenced by identification and affirmation), attitudes towards the unfavorable groups are
not. For instance, an important part of one’s Democratic identity may be feelings of positivity
and support for welfare recipients and undocumented immigrants, whereas negativity towards
police officers and gun-rights activists may not be a core part of this identity.
Study 2 also assessed the effect of self- and group-affirmation on participants’ individuallevel responses to the collective-level threat. Although affirmation condition had no effect on
challenge/thereat experiences, a distinction did emerge between self-affirmation and groupaffirmation with respect to participants’ levels of state self-esteem. Only participants who
affirmed their individual selves before the threat received a boost to their self-esteem (although
this interaction effect was marginal). Those who affirmed their political party did not receive this
boost, regardless of when they affirmed.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Research in a multitude of social psychological domains points to a fundamental
distinction between individual-level processes and collective-level processes. One overarching
finding is that when operating at the collective level of identity, people tend to behave in a more
aggressive and defensive manner and adhere to group-based norms and biases to a greater extent
than when operating at the individual level of identity. I posit that this occurs because a
collective-level mind-set limits one’s psychological flexibility, causing one to think, feel, and
behave more in line with the norms, attitudes and biases of a specific group identity (as well as
the intergroup context as a whole). The distinction between the individual self and the collective
self is particularly apparent in research on identity threat and affirmation theory. Although
affirming the individual self consistently reduces defensiveness and bias in the face of
individual-level threats (Cohen et al., 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997), affirming the collective self
does not consistently reduce, and in some cases exacerbates, bias in the face of collective-level
threats (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015). I argue that this distinction
occurs because self-affirmation capitalizes on the flexible nature of the individual self (allowing
one to bolster the overall self-concept in a different domain), whereas group-affirmation induces
a focus on a specific social identity, activating its associated psychological attributes and
increasing one’s susceptibility to defensiveness and bias.
However, it is possible that affirming the collective self need not necessarily make one
more biased. Indeed, the purpose of the current research is to provide a direct test of whether
there are certain situations in which affirming a group identity can actually decrease
defensiveness and bias. One potential situation is if the group-affirmation is in response to a
threat to the individual self. Theoretically, it may be hypothesized that, just as affirming the
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individual self can reduce collective-level biases (Sherman & Kim, 2005), affirming the
collective self should reduce individual-level biases. This question was explored in Study 1.
Participants completed a self-threatening word association task and either affirmed their
individual selves, affirmed their collective selves, or did not affirm at all. They then completed a
series of measures assessing task performance attributions, challenge/threat experiences,
engagement with the task domain, and state self-esteem. Neither self- nor group-affirmation had
an impact on performance attributions, challenge/threat emotions, and task engagement.
However, there was an effect of affirmation condition on self-esteem, such that participants who
affirmed their individual selves reported higher levels of state self-esteem following the selfthreat than participants who affirmed their collective selves (or did not affirm at all).
Additionally, an exploratory mediation analysis revealed that this effect of self-affirmation on
self-esteem was partially mediated by participants’ disengagement from the self-threatening task
domain.
The lack of an effect of affirmation condition on performance attributions is surprising. It
was predicted that, based on a large body of research touting the effectiveness of self-affirmation
(McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2002), participants who affirmed their individual
selves would be more willing to make self-threatening attributions for their poor performances
on the RAT than those who did not affirm. This outcome is potentially a result of the nature of
the task. It may have been the case that the difficulty of the word associations overwhelmed
participants’ experiences to the point that any sort of affirmation may have been ineffective.
Indeed, it was found that, regardless of affirmation condition, participants attributed their
performance to the difficulty of the task more so than any other factor. Despite not having an
effect on performance attributions, affirming the individual self did bolster participants’ state
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self-esteem following the self-threat. Affirming the collective self, however, did not have this
self-bolstering effect. This points to a distinction between affirming at the individual level as
opposed to the collective level of identity.
A second situation in which affirming the collective self may decrease bias is if certain
unbiased attitudes are core components of the affirmed group’s identity. It may be the case, for
example, that an important part of a particular group identity (such as a political party) is having
positive, benevolent attitudes towards certain out-groups. If it is the case that group-affirmation
activates the psychological constructs associated with that particular identity, then less biased
attitudes (in this case, positive out-group attitudes) should become more prevalent after the
affirmation. This hypothesis was tested in Study 2. Participants read an article that presented
threatening information about their political party and completed either a self-affirming, political
party-affirming, or a non-affirming task. They then completed a series of measures assessing
their attitudes towards two out-groups that members of their political party tend to view
favorably and two out-groups that members of their political party tend to view unfavorably.
Although affirmation condition did not affect attitudes towards unfavorable out-groups, it did
interact with party identification to alter emotional reactions, general evaluations, and positive
behavioral intentions towards favorable out-groups. Specifically, affirming the group boosted
positive out-group attitudes, particularly for those participants who did not identify strongly with
their political party. Thus, for those who group-affirmed, the relationship between group
identification and out-group attitudes was weakened, such that all participants behaved more like
high-identifiers. A similar pattern of results was found for those who self-affirmed.
Additionally, a distinction between self-affirmation and group-affirmation emerged with
respect to participants’ state self-esteem following the group-level threat. Only participants who
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affirmed their individual selves before the threat received a boost to their self-esteem (although
this interaction effect was marginal). Those who affirmed their political party did not receive this
boost, regardless of when they affirmed. Thus, a similar dichotomy between self- and groupaffirmation was found in both Study 1 and Study 2. Self-affirmation protected the self from both
individual-level threats and collective-level threats, but group-affirmation did not.
To summarize, affirming the collective self did not lead to a self-concept boost and
reduction in bias in response to an individual-level threat (although affirming the individual-self
also did not reduce bias). However, group-affirmation did reduce bias in response to a collectivelevel threat when unbiased attitudes (defined as positive emotional reactions, evaluations, and
prosocial behavioral intentions towards out-groups) were a component of the affirmed group’s
psychological identity.
Theoretical Implications
The findings from Study 1 and Study 2 have implications for affirmation theory as well
as for the theoretical nature of the individual and collective selves more broadly.
Affirmation Theory. Although some researchers operate under the assumption that selfand group-affirmation should behave analogously in the face of threats to the individual and
collective selves, respectively (Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007), a substantial amount of
research seems to indicate that affirming the self and affirming the group are two distinct
processes (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015; Glasford et al., 2009). When
focused on the personal self, an affirmation task consistently reduces both self and group-serving
biases. Research suggests that this occurs because self-affirmation broadens one’s focus away
from the threatened domain and onto one’s overall self-concept of worth, rendering judgments
and biases related to other specific self-aspects or identities less psychologically relevant
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(Critcher & Dunning, 2015). Support for this process was found in the current research.
Although affirming the self did not have an impact on self-serving attributional biases, it did
bolster the self-esteem of participants in response to both an individual-level threat (Study 1) and
a collective-level threat (Study 2). The notion that self-affirmation broadens one’s focus was also
supported by the exploratory results of Study 1’s mediation model. Although definitive
conclusions from this analysis cannot be reached due to the cross-sectional nature of the data and
post-hoc reasoning, it was found that participants who self-affirmed tended to be less engaged
with their task performance than those in all other affirmation conditions. This disengagement, in
turn, predicted higher levels of state self-esteem. Thus, participants tended to be less focused on
the specific domain of their self-concept associated with the threat, and this was related to a
tendency to feel better about themselves overall.
Rather than inducing a broader focus on the overall self-concept, I argue that groupaffirmation narrows one’s focus onto a specific group-level identity. In doing so, groupaffirmation activates the psychological attributes (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, norms, behavioral
tendencies, intergroup comparisons) pertinent to that group membership. Once activated, this
group-specific mindset guides subsequent thoughts, judgments, motivations, and behaviors. In
many instances, a by-product of this mindset would be an increase in biases that serve to
establish, protect, and enhance the worth and integrity of that group. In the case of the current
research, however, when positive out-group attitudes were a part of the affirmed group’s
psychological make-up, group-affirmation increased that out-group favorability (specifically for
those who were not already highly identified with the in-group). Additionally, if groupaffirmation does indeed narrow one’s focus onto a particular social identity (as opposed to one’s
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overall feelings of worth), then it makes sense that affirming the group did not provide a boost to
participants’ self-esteem in response to threat.
Three other issues related to affirmation theory are worth further discussion in light of
these findings. The first is the relationship between identity affirmation and self-esteem. The
direct link between self-affirmation and state self-esteem has not been assessed very often in the
literature. Generally, when self-esteem is included in a study on affirmation theory, it is treated
as a moderator of affirmation effects rather than an outcome (e.g., Creswell et al., 2005). The
current research builds off of the limited work exploring the effect of self-affirmation on selfesteem (Koole et al., 1999; Spencer-Rogers et al., 2016), by reinforcing the notion that selfaffirmation can bolster self-esteem following both an individual-level and collective-level threat.
It also emphasizes the distinction between affirming the individual self as opposed to affirming
the collective self, such that group-affirmation was not effective at bolstering the self following
threat.
The second theoretical issue relates to the timing of the affirmation manipulation.
Although some researchers have concluded that whether the affirmation is administered before
or after the threat is not a pertinent factor when it comes to assessing its effectiveness (McQueen
& Klein, 2006), I found that order did play a minor role. Although self-affirmation bolstered
participants’ self-esteem after an individual-level threat in Study 1 regardless of order, it only
buffered against the collective threat in Study 2 if it was performed before participants were
exposed to the group-threatening information. This discrepancy could be due to the nature of the
threat. Critcher et al. (2010) argue that self-affirmation is most effective at providing a boost to
the self-concept if it occurs before a defensive threat-response is initiated. The RAT performed
by participants in Study 1 was a long, difficult task that likely consumed a considerable amount
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of cognitive resources. It may have taken those participants longer to process the threat and
initiate a response than the participants in Study 2 who were only exposed to a quick, direct
group-level threat. Thus, those who self-affirmed after the threat in Study 2 may have already
initiated their defensive processes by the time they began the manipulation, whereas for those
participating in Study 1, this was not the case.
The final issue relates to what constitutes an affirmation process. Specifically, these
findings (and the findings in the affirmation theory literature more generally) seem to question
the notion that one can truly be affirmed at the collective level of identity. If performing a groupaffirmation task does not bolster one’s self-concept and triggers a process that is qualitatively
distinct from performing a self-affirmation task (as is being posited here), is it even possible to
“affirm” the collective self? Perhaps the group-affirmation process differs depending on the
nature of the affirmation procedure. Although this research employed the traditional and
commonly used values-affirmation manipulation, it may be the case that a less immersive
manipulation (such as receiving positive feedback about the in-group) will be able to provide a
boost to self-worth without necessarily “activating” the collective-level mind-set and making
attitudes and biases associated with that group identity psychologically predominant.
Nature of the Individual and Collective Selves. I believe that the findings from the
current research fit within a theoretical model in which the collective self is conceptualized as a
collection of multiple, independent social identities, or “branches” extending out from one’s
overall self-concept. When a specific group membership, or “branch,” becomes salient (as is
likely the case when one affirms a group identity), one becomes psychologically constrained and
thus more prone to thinking and behaving in line with the attributes and guiding norms of that
group. In Study 2, for example, participants who affirmed their political party identity exhibited
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a relatively high level of favorability towards out-groups they were “supposed” to feel favorable
towards based on their political party membership. When operating as an individual, on the other
hand, (such as following an affirmation of the personal self) the self-concept becomes more
malleable as one can experience and respond to his/her social environment independent of any
group-based frame. Thus, participants in both Study 1 and Study 2 who self-affirmed showed a
boost in self-esteem following threat, whereas those who group-affirmed did not. These findings
also fit in with the notion that the individual self is motivationally primary (as compared to the
collective self; Gaertner et al., 2002; Sedikides et al., 2013). Indeed, if the individual self is one’s
“psychological home base,” then it would be expected that affirming at that level of identity
would be more effective at countering threats, maintaining self-esteem, and decreasing bias than
affirming the collective level of identity.
One finding that seemingly runs counter to the notion that affirming the individual self
and affirming the collective self are qualitatively distinct processes is the similar effect of selfand group-affirmation on positive out-group attitudes in Study 2. However, although affirming
the self and affirming the group led to the same outcome, it is possible that it was through
different mechanisms. In fact, it was initially hypothesized that, because self-affirmation tends to
bolster feelings of overall self-worth and lead to a reduction in bias across domains, those who
self-affirmed would exhibit positive attitudes towards out-group members. I would argue that
group-affirmation, on the other hand, led to this similar result through an activation of the group
enhancing attitudes consistent with participants’ specific political identities.
Practical Implications
Although the current research has a heavy theoretical focus, there are also practical
implications of these findings. One implication is the comparative effectiveness of self- and
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group-affirmation to effect change. Research shows that affirming the individual self can be used
as an effective intervention for a variety of social purposes, such as enhancing academic
achievement, reducing stereotype threat, and improving health outcomes (Cohen & Sherman,
2014). The current research suggests that affirming the collective identity, however, may not
have these same benefits. If group-affirmation does not adequately boost feelings of self-worth
or reduce bias and defensiveness in response to self-threats, interventions that target this level of
identity may not have the potency to produce the desired results. Thus, when attempting to
improve academic achievement of minority students or encourage college students to heed
messages promoting safe sex, for example, affirmation interventions should target the individual
level of identity rather than the collective.
An affirmation of one’s collective identity may be especially detrimental when the goal is
to effect change at the intergroup level. In situations of group-based competition and conflict, for
example, events that affirm one’s group membership may further intensify the conflict, rather
than mitigate it. It might be expected, for instance, that if a group achieves success (such as a
political party winning an election), the affirmation that results from that success will bolster
group members’ feelings of self-worth, thus making them more amenable to compromise and
working with out-groups. The group-affirmation effects found in the current and previous
research, however, seem to indicate that this would not be the case. Rather, reminders of group
success and importance are likely to create even more division and ingroup-favoring tendencies
by reinforcing the ideals, goals, and attributes that make the “affirmed” group unique. This
activation of the group’s psychological attributes would subsequently guide future behavior
towards out-groups. If performing a short affirmation task can have a significant effect on
intergroup attitudes, it is not a stretch to believe that naturally occurring group-affirming
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mechanisms or events (such as subtle reminders of group distinctions or important values) could
be a detriment to peaceful intergroup interactions.
Finally, this research raises the practical question of whether it is possible to bolster the
self-concept and reduce intergroup bias while still operating at the collective level of identity.
Some of the most effective strategies for reducing intergroup bias and conflict rely on processes
that break down group boundaries and detach individuals from their collective identities. This
can be done directly through interventions that seek to alter the identity level at which
individuals categorize themselves and out-group members (e.g., Rey et al., 2008) or indirectly
through processes such as intergroup contact, which involves breaking down group boundaries
through a personalization of individual out-group members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Even
self-affirmation reduces group-level bias by shifting one’s focus away from the threatening
group-level domain (Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015). In many group-based contexts, however, this
escape from the collective mind-set is not possible. Based on the current findings, one potential
strategy for reducing biased thinking while still operating as a group member might be to make
unbiased attitudes a core component of the in-group’s psychological identity. For example,
interventions designed to reduce partisan political conflict may find success by framing
controversial policy positions or intergroup dialogue in a manner that fits in with the group’s
existing goals and values.
Limitations
Although this work has some interesting theoretical and practical implications, there are
also some limitations to these studies that should be addressed. First, as discussed above, the
individual-level threat used in Study 1 may have overwhelmed participants, making it difficult to
draw any definitive conclusions regarding the effects of self- and group-affirmation on self-
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serving attributional biases. It cannot be confirmed, for instance, if affirming the group failed to
reduce individual-level biases because of the nature of the threat or because of a general lack of
effectiveness of group-affirmation. I believe that this study should be re-run with a new threat
that has the power to elicit differences across affirmation condition. This could be done in the
context of a threatening health message. There is ample evidence that affirming the individual
self makes people more willing to acknowledge health risks associated with harmful behaviors
such as smoking and excessive alcohol consumption (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011;
Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). A future study should assess whether affirming the collective identity
can also reduce defensiveness in the face of such health-related threats.
A second limitation relates to how collective-level bias was conceptualized in Study 2.
One of the underlying questions of this research is whether group-affirmation might reduce
collective-level bias if a reduction in bias is a core component of the affirmed group’s identity. In
the current research, reduction in collective-level bias was defined as an increase in positive
attitudes towards out-groups that participants’ political parties tend to view favorably. It could be
argued, however, that harboring more favorable attitudes towards groups one is supposed to like
is actually an exemplification of increased bias (such that individuals become more biased
towards the groups they are already supposed to view favorably). I think it would be useful to
replicate the conceptual findings of Study 2 with a more direct definition of bias. For example,
perhaps there is a particular group identity (such as being a scientist) in which evaluating
information in an objective, unbiased way is a core component of that identity. Based on the
theoretical reasoning discussed earlier, it would be predicted that affirming one’s scientist
identity would lead one to interpret new information in a more objective manner, even if there
was a personal incentive not to.
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Finally, although the findings of the current research support the theoretical distinction
between affirming the individual self and affirming the collective self, these studies do not
directly test the proposed mechanisms underlying the self- and group-affirmation processes. For
instance, although I propose that affirming a particular group identity activates the norms,
attitudes, and biases associated with that group’s psychological make-up, that activation process
was not tested directly. Thus, the observed affirmation effects could still be a result of extraneous
factors characteristic of the particular groups being studied. McQueen and Klein (2006) state that
it is even difficult to trace a specific cause-effect mechanism for self-affirmation processes and
admit that it is quite possible that different mechanisms might be at work in different contexts.
Further research should specifically differentiate the disparate mechanisms underlying selfaffirmation and group-affirmation in these specific contexts.
Future Directions
Despite these limitations, this work creates some avenues for potentially fruitful areas of
future research. These studies are based on a fundamental theoretical distinction between the
individual self and the collective self. One question that arises from this is how these affirmation
processes would play out when this distinction between the individual and collective selves is
blurred. For example, how might people with more interdependent views of the self, such as
individuals from Eastern, collectivist cultures, respond to a group-affirmation as opposed to selfaffirmation task? Would they show a pattern of results similar to the one shown by participants
in the current studies? Perhaps affirming at the collective level of identity would be more
effective at boosting self-worth and reducing bias for those with more interdependent selves,
seeing as their self-concepts tend to be defined more by relationships than by individual traits
and attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). There is some evidence that this might be the case.
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Heine and Lehman (1997), for instance, found that affirming the individual self was an effective
method of reducing post-decision dissonance for a group of Canadian participants but not for a
group of Japanese participants. Additionally, performing a familial affirmation (affirming one’s
family as a unit rather than oneself as an individual) was found to successfully improve academic
performance among struggling Latino students (Covarrubias, Herrmann, and Fryberg, 2016) and
reduce stereotype threat among a sample of Chinese women (Cai, Sedikides, & Jiang, 2012).
These findings seem to indicate that an important factor in determining whether an affirmation
manipulation will “work,” is if one is affirming an identity that is central to one’s self-definition
(i.e., one’s personal identity in individualist cultures and one’s familial identity in collectivist
cultures). Future research should test whether affirming a more interdependent identity can lead
to a reduction in group-based bias for those with an interdependent self-concept (just as
affirming an individual-level self-aspect does for those with an individualist self-concept).
Additionally, whether affirming a group identity that is not necessarily the central piece of one’s
self-concept (such as political or religious affiliation) would play out the same way across
cultures should be explored. For example, would affirming a political identity activate the
norms/attitudes/biases associated with that identity regardless of whether one has an independent
or interdependent sense of self?
Another theoretical question related to self-definition has to do with the relationship
between group-affirmation and social identity complexity. Social identity complexity refers to
the degree of overlap one perceives among their multiple social identities (Roccas & Brewer,
2002). If one perceives a great deal of overlap between multiples identities (such as their
political, religious, occupational, and educational identities), for instance, one’s identity structure
becomes more simplified, resulting in stronger levels of in-group identification and less tolerant
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attitudes towards out-groups than those with high levels of social identity complexity (Miller,
Brewer, & Arbuckle, 2009). It would be interesting to test whether social identity complexity
moderates the effect of group-affirmation on defensiveness and bias. If one shares a number of
interrelated identities (and thus is low in social identity complexity), would affirming one of
these social identities have a similar result as affirming the individual self (and potentially reduce
bias) because that identity would presumably be more central to one’s overall self-concept? Or
would affirming the collective identity lead to even stronger biased tendencies because it would
be activating the norms, attitudes, and biases associated with all of the overlapping groups (as
opposed to just one)?
Future research should also assess the boundary conditions of the affirmation effects
observed in these studies. It may be the case, for instance, that the idiosyncrasies of the social
identity context that was used may have been driving some of the observed effects. Political
identity is unique in that it is a highly competitive and bias-ridden intergroup context. It has been
found, for instance, that American political identities are extremely susceptible to perceived
threats (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014) and that sociopolitical concepts are especially “hot,” or
affectively charged, such that people tend to behave in a more biased, hostile manner in political
contexts than in other collective-level domains (Lodge & Taber, 2005). I posit that this is an
advantage when it comes to testing for affirmation effects on bias. The political context provides
a potent source of bias with which to explore the nuances of self- and group-affirmation. This
may not be the case in collective-level contexts not defined as much by this intergroup dynamic,
such as university affiliation or nationality. That being said, future work should test if the
observed affirmation effects are limited to contexts in which there are clearly-defined biases and
salient out-groups. Also, would a similar pattern of results be found if these studies were
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conducted in the context of a group where members do not have a choice in membership, such as
ethnicity? Additionally, would the results hold in a minimal-groups setting, or does groupaffirmation only have an effect on bias if the groups are well-established?
Finally, the current research deals exclusively with affirmation processes at the individual
and collective levels of identity. However, researchers often present the self-concept as
containing three levels of identity: the individual self, the collective self, and the relational self
(Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Sedikides et al., 2013). One question worth exploring is how the
psychological processes that take place when one is operating at the relational level of identity
map on to the other two levels. Specifically, does affirming the relational self function in a
similar fashion to affirming the collective self? Or do important relationships merge with the
individual self to the extent that affirming oneself as an individual and affirming one’s
relationship become one and the same process?
CONCLUSION
It could be argued that it is the distinction between the individual self and the collective
self which forms the backbone of social psychology. Research on the relationship between these
two levels of identity point to a fundamental distinction in how people think, feel, and behave
when operating at the collective level of identity as opposed to the individual level of identity. I
posit that when operating as a group member, one becomes constrained by the norms and biases
associated with that particular social identity, thus limiting one’s cognitive, affective, and
behavioral flexibility. When operating as an individual, on the other hand, the self-concept
becomes more malleable as one can experience and respond to his/her social environment
independent of any group-based frame. Because of its inherent inflexibility, operating at the
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collective level of identity generally leads to the expression of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors
that are defensive, biased, and even hostile in nature. This may not always be the case, however.
The current research uses the context of identity threat and affirmation theory to test
whether operating at the collective level of identity (via group-affirmation) can, in fact, lead to a
reduction in defensiveness, hostility, and bias. Although affirming the group did not affect
participants’ attributional tendencies following the completion of a self-threatening task (Study
1), group-affirmation did bolster positive out-group attitudes for low-identifying group members
(Study 2). Specifically, those who affirmed their political party demonstrated a boost in
positivity towards out-groups that their party tends to view favorably. Also, unlike affirming the
self, affirming the group did not protect participants’ self-esteem from either an individual-level
threat or a collective-level threat (Studies 1 and 2). Together, these findings lend further support
to the notion that affirming the self and affirming the group are two distinct processes. However,
they show that operating at the collective level of identity can, in fact, lead to greater intergroup
positivity, provided that positivity is a core part of the in-group’s psychological identity.
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Endnotes
1.) Because the self-threatening task involved making associations between common English
words and phrases, analyses were also run with non-native English speakers removed
from the sample. This did not result in any changes to the pattern of results, so all
reported analyses include those participants.
2.) Previous research documents the self-threatening nature of the RAT (e.g., Critcher &
Dunning, 2015; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984). In addition, a pilot test was conducted to
ensure that participants would feel threatened when they attempted the specific version of
the RAT used in Study 1. Undergraduate participants (N = 146) rated their performance
on the RAT as “below average” (M = 2.19, SD = 0.77) on a 5-point scale (1 = bottom
10%, 2 = blow average, 3 = average, 4 = above average, 5 = top 10%). This mean selfperformance rating of 2.19 was significantly below the “average” perceived performance
option of 3, t(145) = -12.63, p < .001. Participants also were asked how “intelligent,”
“competent,” and “good” the task made them feel on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7
(extremely). Participants reported feeling well below scale the mid-point of 4 on each of
these items: “Intelligent” (M = 2.61; SD = 1.38); “Competent” (M = 2.83; SD = 1.34);
“Good” (M = 2.83; SD = 1.47); ts(145) > 16, ps < .001.
3.) The Anger/Fear/Respect Index (Mackie et al., 2000) is a scale comprised of three
dimensions. Because the items that composed the “anger” and “fear” dimensions
followed the same pattern in all analyses, they were combined into one “negative”
dimension.
4.) All GLM analyses were also run using attitudinal measures towards individual outgroups as opposed to combining both favorable groups and both unfavorable groups into
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single variables (i.e., classifying just police/law-enforcement officers as the favorable
group for Republicans and welfare recipients as the favorable group for Democrats). The
same pattern of results that was found when combining groups was found when each
group was analyzed individually.
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Table 1
Bivariate correlations among RAT performance attribution measures (Study 1).
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Bad luck

1

.09

.00

.15*

.31*

.20*

.06

.09

2. Difficult task

--

1

.25*

.09

-.01

-.25*

.07

.18*

3. Lack of ability

--

--

1

-.07

-.04

-.03

.29*

.17*

4. Lack of effort

--

--

--

1

.04

.10

.05

-.17*

5. Good luck

--

--

--

--

1

.35*

.15*

.26*

6. Easy task

--

--

--

--

--

1

.21*

.22*

7. Ability

--

--

--

--

--

--

1

.15*

8. Effort

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

1

Note. N = 401.
*p < .05.
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Table 2
Means (standard deviations) of performance attribution measures within affirmation condition
(Study 1).
Control

Self-Affirm

Nation-Affirm

Party-Affirm

Bad luck

2.37 (1.45)

2.35 (1.54)

2.46 (1.38)

2.53 (1.45)

Difficult task

4.84 (1.57)

4.86 (1.44)

4.94 (1.33)

4.61 (1.50)

Lack of ability

3.95 (1.51)

3.54 (1.49)

3.88 (1.51)

3.82 (1.62)

Lack of effort

3.20 (1.51)

3.60 (1.49)

3.50 (1.55)

3.51 (1.71)

Good luck

2.24 (1.41)

2.10 (1.40)

2.18 (1.39)

1.95 (1.09)

Easy task

2.08 (1.08)

2.18 (1.18)

2.35 (1.21)

2.21 (1.31)

High ability

3.43 (1.49)

3.47 (1.45)

3.45 (1.46)

3.56 (1.51)

High effort

3.48 (1.37)

3.31 (1.41)

3.42 (1.27)

3.10 (1.56)

Luck

3.60 (0.78)

3.42 (0.97)

3.63 (0.70)

3.43 (0.97)

Task difficulty

1.71 (0.85)

1.84 (0.93)

1.70 (0.82)

1.93 (1.06)

Ability

2.42 (0.95)

2.41 (0.99)

2.25 (0.96)

2.32 (0.96)

Effort

2.27 (0.96)

2.32 (0.97)

2.43 (0.98)

2.33 (0.89)

Rankings

Note. N = 401. Values for individual attributions range from one to seven. Values for attribution
rankings range from one to four.
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Table 3
Bivariate correlations among challenge/threat experiences, task engagement, and state self-esteem
(Study 1).
Variable

1

2

3

4

1. Challenge

1

.37*

.14*

-.02

2. Threat

--

1

.23*

-.23*

3. Task engagement

--

--

1

-.33*

4. Self-esteem

--

--

--

1

Note. N = 401.
*p < .05.
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Table 4
Means (standard deviations) of challenge/threat experiences, task engagement, and state selfesteem within affirmation condition (Study 1)
Control

Self-Affirm

Nation-Affirm

Party-Affirm

Challenge

2.65 (1.39)

2.73 (1.32)

2.99 (1.17)

2.81 (1.32)

Threat

2.47 (1.31)

2.53 (1.44)

2.77 (1.46)

2.49 (1.44)

Task engagement

3.04 (1.18)

2.76 (1.22)

3.02 (1.13)

3.08 (1.20)

Self-esteem

5.21 (1.05)

5.46 (0.94)

5.19 (1.08)

5.04 (1.06)

Note. N = 401.
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Table 5
Bivariate correlations among out-group attitudinal variables broken down by favorable and
unfavorable groups (Study 2).
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Negative Emotions

1

-.06

-.49*

-.24*

.35*

.31*

.12*

.16*

2. Positive Emotions

--

1

.73*

.57*

.26*

-.09*

-.21*

.001

3. General Evaluations

--

--

1

.65*

.10*

-.17*

-.18*

-.06

4. Behavioral Intentions

--

--

--

1

.20*

.03

-.07

.32*

5. Negative Emotions

--

--

--

--

1

-.07

-.51*

-.22*

6. Positive Emotions

--

--

--

--

--

1

.73*

.63*

7. General Evaluations

--

--

--

--

--

--

1

.62*

8. Behavioral Intentions

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

1

Favorable Groups

Unfavorable Groups

Note. N = 533.
*p < .05.
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Table 6
Means (standard deviations) of challenge/threat experiences and state self-esteem (when
participants were affirmed either before or after the threat) broken down by affirmation
condition (Study 2)
Control

Self-Affirm

Party-Affirm

Challenge

3.46 (1.67)

3.67 (1.70)

3.48 (1.67)

Threat

2.04 (1.35)

2.08 (1.39)

2.29 (1.43)

Self-esteem (affirm first)

5.57 (1.29)

5.82 (1.20)

5.27 (1.44)

Self-esteem (threat first)

5.53 (1.37)

5.35 (1.27)

5.50 (1.53)

Note. N = 533.
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Figure 1. Effect of affirmation condition on participants’ state self-esteem following a threat to

Self-Esteem

the individual self (Study 1). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the means.
5.8
5.7
5.6
5.5
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.1
5
4.9
4.8
Self-Affirm
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Nation-Affirm

Affirmation Condition
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Figure 2. Exploratory model demonstrating that task disengagement partially mediates the effect
of self-affirmation (compared to all other affirmation conditions) on state self-esteem (Study 1).
Numbered paths reflect unstandardized regression coefficients (b). Indirect effect: b = -.08, SE =
0.04, 95% C.I. [-0.17, -0.004].
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.

Task
Engagement
0.29*

-0.28***

Affirmation
Condition
0 = Self
1 = Other

Self-Esteem
-0.31**/-0.23*
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Figure 3. Party identification predicting positive emotional reactions towards favorable outgroup members in the non-affirmation (control) condition, self-affirmation condition, and
political party-affirmation condition (Study 2). “High” and “low” levels of party identification
refer to 1 SD above and below the mean, respectively.
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Figure 4. Party identification predicting general evaluations towards favorable out-group
members in the non-affirmation (control) condition, self-affirmation condition, and political
party-affirmation condition (Study 2). “High” and “low” levels of party identification refer to 1
SD above and below the mean, respectively.
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Figure 5. Party identification predicting behavioral intentions towards favorable out-group
members in the non-affirmation (control) condition, self-affirmation condition, and political
party-affirmation condition (Study 2). “High” and “low” levels of party identification refer to 1
SD above and below the mean, respectively.
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Figure 6. Effect of affirmation condition and presentation order on participants’ state self-esteem
following a threat to the collective self (Study 2). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
around the means.
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Appendix A
Affirmation Manipulation (Study 1 and Study 2)
Non-Affirmation
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some
time and think about everything that you have eaten and drank over the past 48 hours. In the
space provided, please list as many of these things as you can remember.
Self-Affirmation
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some
time and think about what you as an individual consider to be important. From the following list
of values/issues*, please select the one that is most important to you personally. Please write a
short paragraph explaining how this value or issue is relevant to you and why you consider it to
be so important.
Nationality-Affirmation (Study 1 only)
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some
time now and think about what members of your nationality (e.g., Americans) consider to be
important. From the following list of values/issues*, please select the one that you think is the
most important to members of your nationality as a group. Please write a short paragraph
explaining how this value/issue is relevant to members of your nationality, and why they
consider it to be so important.
Political Party-Affirmation
Okay, we are now going to ask you to perform a simple thought experiment. Please take some
time and think about what [Republicans/Democrats] consider to be important. From the
following list of values/issues*, please select the one that you think is the most important to the
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[Republican/Democratic] party as a group. Please write a short paragraph explaining how this
value/issue is relevant to the [Republican/Democratic] party, and why [Republicans/Democrats]
consider it so important.

*Values/Issues: Art/Music, Social Life, Relationships, Physical Attractiveness/Fashion,
Athletics, Sense of Humor, Loyalty, Family, Honesty, Patience, Concern for Others,
Religion/Spirituality, Independence
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Appendix B
Remote Associates Test (Study 1)
Instructions
The next section of the survey will consist of a test of cognitive ability. You will be presented
with a series of 10 questions testing your ability to make associations between words. For each
trial, you will first see three stimulus words. Your task is to type in a fourth word which, when
combined with each of the three stimulus words, results in word pairs that make up a common
compound word or phrase. For example:
What word unites these three?
rocking
wheel
high
Correct response: Chair (rocking chair, wheelchair, high chair). After completing the task, you
will be asked some questions regarding how well you performed.
RAT Items
(1) Pea, Shell, Chest = Nut; (2) Reading, Service, Stick = lip; (3) Flower, Friend, Scout = girl;
(4) Control, Place, Rate = Birth; (5) Artist, Hatch, Route = Escape; (6) Self, Attorney, Spending
= Defense; (7) Way, Ground, Weather = Fair; (8) Cottage, Swiss, Cake = Cheese; (9) Show,
Life, Row = Boat; (10) Fight, Control, Machine = Gun
Feedback
You have now completed the word association test. You got [number correct] out of 10 questions
correct.
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Appendix C
RAT Performance Attributions (Study 1)
Individual Attributions
Not at all
1

Very much so
2

3

4

5

6

7

1. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of good luck?
2. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of bad luck?
3. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of the task being easy?
4. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of the task being difficult?
5. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of your ability to do well on tasks like these?
6. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of your inability to do well on tasks like these?
7. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of you putting a lot of effort into the task?
8. To what extend do you think your performance on the word association task was the
result of you not putting very much effort into the task?
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Attribution Rankings
Please rank the following factors* in the order in which you think they had an impact on your
performance on the word association task, from greatest to least. In other words, the factor on top
should be the one that you think had the biggest effect on your performance, whereas the factor
on the bottom should be the one that you think had the smallest effect.

*Factors: Luck, Task difficulty, Your ability, Your effort
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Appendix D
Intellectual Orientation Inventory: Task Engagement Subscale (Major et al., 1998)
(Study 1)
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the word
association task:

Strongly disagree
1

Strongly agree
2

3

4

5

6

1. Being good at tasks like this is an important part of who I am.
2. Doing well on intelligence tasks like this is very important to me.
3. It doesn’t matter to me one way or the other how well I did on that task.*
4. This task does not change my opinion of how intelligent I am.*
5. My performance on this task affected how I feel about myself.
6. I really don’t care what this task says about my intelligence.*

*Denotes a reverse coded item

7
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Appendix E
Biosocial Model of Challenge and Threat Scale (Blascovich et al., 2001)
(Study 1 and Study 2)
Please indicate the extent to which you are feeling each of the following emotions right now:

Not at all
1

1. Fearful
2. Worried
3. Anxious
4. Eager
5. Hopeful
6. Excited

Very much so
2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix F
State Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)
(Study 1 and Study 2)
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding how you
feel about yourself right now:

Not at all
1

Very much so
2

3

4

5

6

1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.*
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.*
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.*
9. I certainly feel useless at times.*
10. At times I think I am no good at all.*

*Denotes a reverse coded item

7

90
Appendix G
Group-Threatening Stimulus (Study 2)
Instructions
You will now be presented with a brief article summarizing the findings from a recent
study on political parties and intelligence. Please read the article closely.
Democratic Participants
A new study came out recently looking at whether Republicans or Democrats are smarter.
It showed that Republicans are generally more intelligent than Democrats, and that this holds
true even after taking race, gender, and other demographic characteristics out of the picture.
Analysts from an independent research group looked at several waves of participants
from the General Social Survey. The survey included four separate measures of intelligence.
Probability knowledge was measured by asking participants to solve basic probability problems.
Verbal intelligence was measured by asking participants to describe the ways in which various
items were similar. A vocabulary test was also given. Finally, interviewers rated how well
participants seemed to understand the questions they were being asked. Political identity was
measured on an eight-point scale, ranging from strong Republican on one end of the scale to
strong Democrat on the other end. Those who selected the mid-point of the scale were classified
as independents.
The study found that Republicans scored better than Democrats on all four measures of
intelligence. The gap was largest when comparing strong Republicans to strong Democrats (3-5
points) and weakest when comparing everyone to the right and everyone to the left of
independent (1-2.45 points). This study also contained sub-group analyses in which subjects
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were restricted by race, gender, and age. It was found that regardless of race, gender, or age
range, Republicans exhibited greater intelligence than Democrats.
This is consistent with previous research linking liberalism with attributes such as
simplistic thinking and an overreliance on emotions when making decisions.
Republican Participants
A new study came out recently looking at whether Republicans or Democrats are smarter.
It showed that Democrats are generally more intelligent than Republicans, and that this holds
true even after taking race, gender, and other demographic characteristics out of the picture.
Analysts from an independent research group looked at several waves of participants
from the General Social Survey. The survey included four separate measures of intelligence.
Probability knowledge was measured by asking participants to solve basic probability problems.
Verbal intelligence was measured by asking participants to describe the ways in which various
items were similar. A vocabulary test was also given. Finally, interviewers rated how well
participants seemed to understand the questions they were being asked. Political identity was
measured on an eight-point scale, ranging from strong Republican on one end of the scale to
strong Democrat on the other end. Those who selected the mid-point of the scale were classified
as independents.
The study found that Democrats scored better than Republicans on all four measures of
intelligence. The gap was largest when comparing strong Democrats to strong Republicans (3-5
points) and weakest when comparing everyone to the left and everyone to the right of
independent (1-2.45 points). This study also contained sub-group analyses in which subjects
were restricted by race, gender, and age. It was found that regardless of race, gender, or age
range, Democrats exhibited greater intelligence than Republicans.
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This is consistent with previous research linking conservatism with attributes such as
simplistic thinking and an overreliance on emotions when making decisions.
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Appendix H
Anger/Fear/Respect Index (Mackie et al., 2000)
(Study 2)
On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), please indicate the extent to which you feel the
following emotions towards [police/law-enforcement officers, gun-rights activists, people on
welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants]:

Not at all
1

1. Angry
2. Furious
3. Irritated
4. Worried
5. Anxious
6. Afraid
7. Fearful
8. Admiring
9. Appreciative
10. Respectful

Very much so
2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix I
General Out-Group Evaluations (Voci & Hewstone, 2003)
(Study 2)
Generally speaking, how would you rate your attitude towards [police/law-enforcement officers,
gun-rights activists, people on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants]:

Cold
1

Warm
2

1. Cold -- Warm
2. Negative -- Positive
3. Hostile -- Friendly
4. Trusting – Suspicious*
5. Disgust -- Admiration
6. Contempt – Respect

*Denotes a reverse-coded item

3

4

5

6

7

95
Appendix J
Behavioral Intentions (Husnu & Crisp, 2010)
(Study 2)
On a scale from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely), please indicate the extent to which you
be willing to do the following things in the near future:

Highly unlikely
1

Highly likely
2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Interact with a(n) [police/law-enforcement officer, gun-rights activist, person on
welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrant].
2. Spend time learning more about [police/law-enforcement officers, gun-rights
activists, people on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants].
3. Attend a gathering of [police/law-enforcement officers, gun-rights activists, people
on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants].
4. Donate money to an advocacy group supporting [police/law-enforcement officers,
gun-rights activists, people on welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrants].
5. Be friends with a(n) [police/law-enforcement officer, gun-rights activist, person on
welfare, undocumented/illegal immigrant].

96
References
Aberson, C. L., Healy, M., & Romero, V. (2000). Ingroup bias and self-esteem: A meta-analysis.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 157-173.
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (2004). Metatheory: Lessons from social identity research.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 98-106.
Adams, G., Tormala, T. T., & O’Brien, L. T. (2006). The effect of self-affirmation on
perceptions of racism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 616-626.
Allport, F. H. (1962). A structuronomic conception of behavior: Individual and collective.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61, 3-30.
Allpress, J. A., Brown, R., Giner-Sorolla, R., Deonna, J. A., & Teroni, F. (2014). Two faces of
group-based shame: Moral shame and image shame differentially predict positive and
negative orientations to ingroup wrongdoing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
40, 1270-1284.
Armitage, C. J., Harris, P. R., & Arden, M. A. (2011). Evidence that self-affirmation reduces
alcohol consumption: Randomized exploratory trial with a new, brief means of selfaffirming. Health Psychology, 30, 633-641.
Blascovich, J., & Mendes, W. B. (2000). Challenge and threat appraisals: The role of affective
cues. In J. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 5982). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Blascovich, J., Mendes, W. B., Hunter, S. B., Lickel, B., & Kowai-Bell, N. (2001). Perceiver
threat in social interactions with stigmatized others. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 80, 253-267.

97
Bourgeois, K. S., & Leary, M. R. (2001). Coping with rejection: Derogating those who choose us
last. Motivation and Emotion, 25, 101-111.
Branscombe, N. R., Doosje, B., & McGarty, C. (2002). Antecedents and consequences of
collective guilt. In D. M. Mackie, & E. R. Smith (Eds.), From prejudice to intergroup
emotions: Differential reactions to social groups (pp. 44-66). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology
Press.
Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 475-482.
Brewer, M. B. (1998). The social psychology of intergroup relations: Social categorization,
ingroup bias, and outgroup prejudice. In G. Lindzey, D. Gilbert, & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), The
handbook of social psychology (4th Ed, pp. 695-715). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “we”? Levels of collective identity and selfrepresentation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 83-93.
Cai, H., Sedikides, C., & Jiang, L. (2012). Familial self as a potent source of affirmation:
Evidence from China. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4, 529-537.
Campbell, W. K., & Sedikides, C. (1999). Self-threat magnifies the self-serving bias: A metaanalytic integration. Review of General Psychology, 3, 23-43.
Campbell, W. K., Sedikides, C., Reeder, G., & Elliot, A. T. (2000). Among friends? An
examination of friendship and the self-serving bias. British Journal of Social Psychology,
39, 229-239.
Cehajic-Clancy, S., Effron, D. A., Halperin, E., Liberman, V., & Ross, L. D. (2011).
Affirmation, acknowledgment of in-group responsibility, group-based guilt, and support for
reparative measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 256-270.

98
Chambers, J. R., Schlenker, B. R., & Collisson, B. (2013). Ideology and prejudice: The role of
value conflicts. Psychological Science, 24, 140-149.
Cohen, G. L., Aronson, J., & Steele, C. M. (2000). When beliefs yield to evidence: Reducing
biased evaluation by affirming the self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26,
1151-1164.
Cohen, G. L., & Sherman, D. K. (2014). The psychology of change: Self-affirmation and social
psychological intervention. Annual Review of Psychology, 65, 333-371.
Correll, J., & Park, B. (2005). A model of the ingroup as a social resource. Personality and
Social Psychology Review, 9, 341-359.
Covarrubias, R., Herrmann, S. D., & Fryberg, S. A. (2016). Affirming the interdependent self:
Implications for Latino student performance. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 38, 4757.
Crawford, J. T., & Pilanski, J. M. (2014). Political intolerance, right and left. Political
Psychology, 35, 841-851.
Creswell, J. D., Welch, W. T., Taylor S. E., Sherman, D. K., Gruenewald, T. L., & Mann, T.
(2005). Affirmation of personal values buffers neuroendocrine and psychological stress
responses. Psychological Science, 16, 846-851.
Critcher, C. R., & Dunning, D. (2015). Self-affirmations provide a broader perspective on selfthreat. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41, 3-18.
Critcher, C. R., Dunning, D., & Armor, D. A. (2010). When self-affirmation reduces
defensiveness: Timing is key. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 947-959.

99
Crocker, J., Blaine, B., & Luhtanen, R. (1993). Prejudice, intergroup behaviour and self-esteem:
Enhancement and protection motive. In M. Hogg, & D. Abrams (Eds.), Group motivation:
Social psychological perspectives (pp. 52-67). New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., & Mischkowski, D. (2008). Why does writing about important values
reduce defensiveness? Self-affirmation and the role of positive other-directed feelings.
Psychological Science, 19, 740-747.
Derks, B., van Laar, C., & Ellemers, N. (2009). Working for the self or working for the group:
How self versus group affirmation affects collective behavior in low-status groups. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 183-202.
DeSteno, D., & Salovey, P. (1997). Structural dynamism in the concept of self: A flexible model
for a malleable concept. Review of General Psychology, 1, 389-409.
Dijker, A. J., Koomen, W., van den Heuvel, H., & Frijda, N. H. (1996). Perceived antecedents of
emotional reactions in inter-ethnic relations. British Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 313329.
Ehrlich, G. A., & Gramzow, R. H. (2015). The politics of affirmation theory: When groupaffirmation leads to greater in-group bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41,
1110-1122.
Ellemers, N., & van Rijswijk, W. (1997). Identity needs versus social opportunities: The use of
group-level and individual-level identity management strategies. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 60, 52-65.
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity. Annual Review of
Psychology, 53, 161-186.

100
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self
through derogating others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 31-44.
Funder, D. C., Levine, J. M., Mackie, D. M., Morf, C. C., Sansone, C., Vazire, S., & West, S. G.
(2014). Improving the dependability of research in personality and social psychology:
Recommendations for research and educational practice. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 18, 3-12.
Gaertner, L., Iuzzini, J., Witt, M. G., Orina, M. M. (2006). Us without them: Evidence for
intragroup origin of positive in-group regard. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 90, 426-439.
Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., Vevea, J. L., & Iuzzini, J. (2002). The “I,” the “we,” and the “when”:
A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 83, 574-591.
Glasford, D., Dovidio, J., & Pratto, F. (2009). I continue to feel so good about us: In-group
identification and the use of social identity-enhancing strategies to reduce intragroup
dissonance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 415-427.
Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective
narcissism and its social consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97,
1074-1096.
Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., & Bilewicz, M. (2013). The paradox of in-group love:
Differentiating collective narcissism advances understanding of the relationship between
in-group and out-group attitudes. Journal of Personality, 81, 16-28.

101
Gunn, G. R., & Wilson, A. E. (2011). Acknowledging the skeletons in our closet: The effect of
group affirmation on collective guilt, collective shame, and reparatory attitudes.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1474-1487.
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A
regression-based approach. New York: The Guilford Press.
Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. (1997). Culture, dissonance, and self-affirmation. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 389-400.
Hogg, M. A. (2003). Social identity. In M. R. Leary, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self
and identity (pp. 462-479). New York: Guilford Press.
Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1990). Social motivation, self-esteem, and social identity. In D.
Abrams, & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances
(pp. 28-47). New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
Hunter, J. A., Platow, M. J., Bell, L. M., & Kypri, K. (1997). Intergroup bias and self-evaluation:
Domain-specific self-esteem, threats to identity, and dimensional importance. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 405-426.
Husnu, S., & Crisp, R. (2010). Elaboration enhances the imagined contact effect. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 943-950.
Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Graetz, K. A., Drigotas, S. M., Currey, D. P., Smith, S. L., et al.
(1994). Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 38, 87-116.
Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Hoyle, R. H., Dardis, G. J., & Graetz, K. A. (1990). Individual-group
discontinuity as a function of fear and greed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
58, 68-79.

102
Jordan, A. H., & Monin, B. (2008). From sucker to saint: Moralization in response to self-threat.
Psychological Science, 19, 809-815.
Koole, S. L., Smeets, K., van Knippenberg, A., & Dijksterhuis, A. (1999). The cessation of
rumination though self-affirmation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
111-125.
Last, S. (2014, November 5). Republicans are smarter than Democrats. The Right Stuff.
Retrieved from http://therightstuff.biz/2014/11/05/republicans-are-smarter-thandemocrats/
Leitner, J. B., Hehman, E., Deegan, M. P., & Jones, J. M. (2014). Adaptive disengagement
buffers self-esteem from negative social feedback. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 40, 1435-1450.
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2005). The automaticity of affect for political leaders, groups, and
issues: An experimental test of the hot cognition hypothesis. Political Psychology, 26, 455482.
Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one’s
social identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 301-318.
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining action
tendencies in an intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 602616.
Major, B., Spencer, S., Schmader, T., Wolfe, C., & Crocker, J. (1998). Coping with negative
stereotypes about intellectual performance: The role of psychological disengagement.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 34-50.

103
Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion,
and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253.
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological perspective.
Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299-337.
Martiny, S. E., Kessler, T., & Vignoles, V. L. (2011). Shall I leave or shall we fight? Effects of
threatened group-based self-esteem on identity management strategies. Group Processes
and Intergroup Relations, 15, 39-55.
McConnell, A. R. (2011). The multiple self-aspects framework: Self-concept representations and
its implications. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 3-27.
McFarlin, D. B., & Blascovich, J. (1984). On the remote associates test (RAT) as an alternative
to illusory performance feedback: A methodological note. Basic and Applied Social
Psychology, 5, 223-229.
McQueen, A., & Klein, W. M. P. (2006). Experimental manipulations of self-affirmation: A
systematic review. Self and Identity, 5, 289-354.
Miller, K. P., Brewer, M. B., & Arbuckle, N. L. (2009). Social identity complexity: Its correlates
and antecedents. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12, 79-94.
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. D. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social
judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Oyserman, D., Elmore, K., & Smith, G. (2012). Self, self-concept, and identity. In M. R. Leary,
& J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (2nd Ed., pp. 69-104). New York:
Guilford Press.
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 751-783.

104
Ray, D. G., Mackie, D. M., Rydell, R. J., & Smith, E. R. (2008). Changing categorization of self
can change emotions about outgroups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44,
1210-1213.
Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 6, 88-106.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Schopler, J., & Insko, C. A. (1992). The discontinuity effect in interpersonal and intergroup
relations: Generality and mediation. European Review of Social Psychology, 3, 121-151.
Sedikides, C. (2012). Self-protection. In M. R. Leary, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self
and identity (2nd Ed., pp. 327-353). New York: Guilford Press.
Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., Luke, M. A., O’Mara, E. M., & Gebauer, J. E. (2013). A three-tier
hierarchy of self-potency: Individual self, relational self, collective self. Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 235-295.
Sherman, D., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting threatening information: Self-affirmation and
the reduction of defensive biases. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 119123.
Sherman, D., & Kim, H. (2005). Is there an 'I' in 'team'? The role of the self in group-serving
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 108-120.
Sherman, D., Kinias, Z., Major, B., Kim, H., & Prenovost, M. (2007). The group as a resource:
Reducing biased attributions for group success and failure via group affirmation.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1100-1112.

105
Shnabel, N., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Cook, J. E., Garcia, J., & Cohen, G. L. (2013). Demystifying
values-affirmation interventions: Writing about social belonging is a key to buffering
against social identity threat. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39, 663-676.
Shu, L. L., Gino, F., & Bazerman, M. H. (2011). Dishonest deed, clear conscious: When
cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 37, 330-349.
Simon, B. (1997). Self and group in modern society: Ten theses on the individual self and the
collective self. In R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N. Ellemers, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social
psychology of stereotyping and group life (pp. 318-335). Oxford: Blackwell.
Smith, E. R. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualizations of
prejudice. In D. M. Mackie, & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping:
Interactive processes in group perception (pp. 297-315). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Snyder, M. L., Stephan, W. G., & Rosenfield, D. (1976). Egotism and attribution. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 435-441.
Spencer, S. J., Fein, S., & Lomore, C. D. (2001). Maintaining one’s self-image vis-à-vis others:
The role of self-affirmation in the social evaluation of the self. Motivation and Emotion, 25,
41-65.
Spencer-Rogers, J., Major, B., Forster, D. E., & Peng, K. (2016). The power of affirming group
values: Group-affirmation buffers the self-esteem of women exposed to blatant sexism. Self
and Identity, 15, 1-19.
Steele, C. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 21: Social Psychological Studies of the
Self: Perspectives and Programs (pp. 261-302). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

106
Sweeney, A. M., & Moyer, A. (2015). Self-affirmation and responses to health messages: A
meta-analysis on intentions and behavior. Health Psychology, 34, 149-159.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S.
Worchel, & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7-24). Chicago:
Nelson-Hall.
Tangney, J. P., & Tracy, J. L. (2012). Self-conscious emotions. In M. R. Leary, & J. P. Tangney
(Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (2nd Ed., pp. 446-478). New York: Guilford Press.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective
on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210.
Tropp, L. R., & Wright, S. C. (2001). Ingroup identification as inclusion of ingroup in the self.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 585-600.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987).
Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition
and social context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 453-463.
Voci, A., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Intergroup contact and prejudice toward immigrants in Italy:
The mediational role of anxiety and the moderational role of group salience. Group
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6, 37-54.
Ware, A. (2011). Political conflict in America. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Wildschut, T., & Insko, C. A. (2007). Explanations of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: A
review of the evidence. European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 175-211.

107
Yzerbyt, V., & Demoulin, S. (2010). Intergroup relations. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, and G.
Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th Ed., pp. 1024-1083). Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
Zarate, M. A., & Garza, A. A. (2002). In-group distinctiveness and self-affirmation as dual
components of prejudice reduction. Self and Identity, 1, 235-249.

108
VITA
NAME OF AUTHOR: Gaven Allen Ehrlich
PLACE OF BIRTH: Rochester, New York
DATE OF BIRTH: April 13, 1988

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, USA
College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts, USA
University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

DEGREES AWARDED:
Master of Science in Social Psychology, 2013, Syracuse University
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology, 2010, College of the Holy Cross

PUBLICATIONS
Ehrlich, G. A., & Gramzow, R. H. (2015). The politics of affirmation theory: When
group-affirmation leads to greater in-group bias. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 41, 1110-1122.
Ehrlich, G. A., & Gramzow, R. H. (2014). Deception, research on. In T. R. Levine (Ed.)
Encyclopedia of deception (pp. 251-254). Los Angeles: Sage Reference.
Hackel, L. M., Larson, G. M., Bowen, J. B., Ehrlich, G. A., Mann, T. C., Middlewood,
B., … Barrett, L. F. (in press). On the neural implausibility of the modular mind:
Evidence for distributed construction of perception, cognition, and emotion. [Peer

109
commentary on “Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence
for ‘top-down’ effects,” by C. Firestone & B. J. Scholl]. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences.

AWARDS AND HONORS:
Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) Graduate Student Travel Award,
2016
SPSP Summer Institute in Social and Personality Psychology (Boston, MA), 2015
Syracuse University Graduate Fellowship, 2011-2015
Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society, Syracuse University Chapter

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Instructor, Department of Psychology, Syracuse University, 2015-2017
Teaching Assistant Coordinator, Department of Psychology, Syracuse University, 20142015
Teaching Assistant, Department of Psychology, Syracuse University, 2012-2013
Conflict Management Center Associate, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs, Syracuse University, 2013-2017

